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Current History

SEPTEMBER, 1960

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Current History

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SEPTEMBER, 1960

No. 229

How strong is Nato as a guarantor of free world security? "When all is said and done . . . Nato started as a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, and the defense of Europe remains its chief, if not its sole purpose." The introductory article that follows examines Nato's origin and purpose, to fill in the background for the six articles that evaluate the role and the strengths of the North Atlantic community.

The Shape of Nato

By RICHARD W. VAN ALSTYNE

Professor of History, University of Southern California

NATO is an international organization made up at the present time of 15 countries who are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. Twelve of the fifteen negotiated and signed the treaty at Washington on April 4, 1949. These were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty on February 18, 1952, and the German Federal Republic followed suit on May 5, 1955.

The core of the treaty is in Article 5, which reads:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

There are some qualifications which, for the sake of accuracy, it would be well for us to note at the beginning: the three Algerian

Departments of France were, at the insistence of that country, included in the original defense area. Then, when Greece and Turkey were invited into the organization, further modifications became necessary. The parties agreed that the territory of Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea should be added to the defense area. Thus the crucial Turkish Straits and the Turkish Republic itself, which is located in Asia Minor and not in Europe, are identified with the security of the North Atlantic countries. This is interesting and important because the primary purpose of Nato is the defense of Western Europe. In the treaty it was stipulated that, by unanimous agreement, the parties might invite any other European state to join. Geographically Turkey is not in Europe, but politically and strategically she is on the frontier of Europe.

Nato has the hallmark of a military alliance—it has been compared with the international alliances of the pre-1914 era. Nevertheless, it is more than a military alliance, though how much more it is indeed difficult to say. It has certain handicaps and weaknesses which have become apparent during the almost 12 years of its existence. Some of these troubles arise from the conflict of interest which emerges from time to time in the

relationships of the principal powers who form the bulwark of its support; violent quarrels have broken out within the family at various intervals, leading to local hostilities as in Cyprus (and yet not severe enough to impair the alliance); and at least one member, Iceland, has been from the very beginning a reluctant and unwilling partner.

These difficulties will undoubtedly be discussed in the articles that follow. Nato has survived the first 10 years. None of its members has demanded a fundamental review, although the treaty specifically authorizes such an inquiry. It remains to be seen whether, after the first 20 years, any of the member countries will choose to secede, as they are permitted to do under Article 13 of the treaty.

Nato's Organization

Meanwhile it will be helpful to have some light thrown on the very considerable organization which has grown up during the last 10 years and which demonstrates that Nato is not a mere replica of the old fashioned alliance. The treaty provided for a Council, to be "so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time"; and the Council was given discretion to create subsidiary agencies. Emphasizing the military emergency of the time, however, the treaty instructed the Council to establish a defense committee at once. This was done in September, 1949, and before the end of the year the Defense Committee, made up of the chiefs-of-staff of the member countries, had agreed upon a "strategic concept" for the "integrated defense of the North Atlantic area."

Customarily the Council consists of the foreign ministers, though there is nothing to prevent heads of state or even deputy ministers from replacing them. The ministers meet two or three times a year; but in the meantime, as a result of an important meeting in Lisbon (February, 1952), the Council became a permanent body, permanent representatives of ambassadorial rank being stationed in residence and acting in the name of their respective governments. At the Lisbon meeting too, the Council created a secretariat headed by a Secretary-General, and established permanent headquarters for the Organization in Paris. Lord Ismay of the United Kingdom became the first Secretary-

General and was succeeded in 1957 by Paul Henri-Spaak, the Belgian foreign minister; the competence of these two men and their reputation as good Europeans have done much to put Nato on a firm and, it is to be hoped, lasting foundation.

Nato has both a civil and a military structure. The Secretary-General heads the civil administration and, except when the foreign ministers convene, serves as chairman of the Council. They who serve under him on the Secretariat are international civil servants and do not take orders from their own governments. The staff is recruited from all 15 member countries, but appointments are made on the basis of personal excellence rather than according to a fixed ratio among the nationalities. In addition, the Permanent Council is divided into a number of committees, but the whole Council customarily meets at least twice a week. The continuity and permanency which the Organization has thus obtained since Lisbon have resulted in reducing the number of occasions when the foreign ministers have come together. When they do, the Secretary-General steps down from the chair in favor of the minister who takes his turn according to alphabet at the beginning of each successive year.

When all is said and done, however, Nato started as a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, and the defense of Europe remains its chief, if not its sole purpose. Directly under the North Atlantic Council is the Military Committee, composed of the chiefs-of-staff of the member countries. At this level the Committee meets at least twice a year but, as in the case of the Council, there is a Permanent Committee comprised of the deputies of the chiefs-of-staff. In a sense subordinate to the Committee, but acting as an executive body is the Standing Group of three, the representatives of the chiefs-of-staff of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. This Group assumes responsibility for the strategic plans of the Organization, the purpose being to insure an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area. The Standing Group directs the various Nato commanders, and is itself represented on the Council by a general officer.

There are three Commands and a Canada-United States Regional Planning Group whose operations embrace the North Atlantic

area. Most familiar is the European Command (Saceur), which has been headed successively by Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, Gruenthal and, since November, 1956, Lauris Norstad. Under the Standing Group, this Command is responsible for the defense of the Allied countries in Europe, from North Cape to North Africa and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey.

But it must be borne in mind that each of the Allied countries maintains its own defense forces, and that Saceur is dependent upon assignments being made to it by the 15 member countries. It is understood that, in the event of war, Saceur would control all Allied operations in Europe, but its effectiveness would still depend upon the loyalty of the separate governments. Saceur has four subordinate commands: Northern, Central and Southern Europe, and the Mediterranean.

Paralleling Saceur, but somewhat different, is the Atlantic Ocean Command (SACLANT), headed since 1954 by Admiral Jerauld Wright, U.S.N., and based in Norfolk, Virginia. SACLANT's area is the Atlantic from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa, with the exception of the British Isles and the English Channel. Unlike Saceur, SACLANT has no permanent forces, but for training purposes the nations involved assign units to it. In the event of war, its duty would be to keep enemy craft from entering the Atlantic and to protect the islands, such as Iceland and the Azores, from enemy seizure. There are three subordinate commands: the Western Atlantic, the Eastern Atlantic, and the Striking Fleet Atlantic Command.

The unique geographical situation of the English Channel and the political importance of the countries adjoining it undoubtedly account for the separate Channel Committee and Channel Command. The Committee consists of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and the Allied Channel Command is under the direction of a British admiral. The fourth of these commands is the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group, which meets alternately in Washington and Ottawa but about which little is known. It would appear to be a con-

tinuation of the Permanent Joint Defense Board, set up under the Ogdensburg Agreement between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1940.

The Anglo-American Community

Mention of Ogdensburg refreshes the memory on the origins of Nato and directs the attention to the one strong, reliable pillar of American international relations: the natural association with Britain and Canada, and the fixed interest in the North Atlantic which all three possess. Relations with other powers change from good to bad, from peace to war or from war to peace, but the Anglo-Canadian-American community has proved its capacity for resisting all shocks. Without it there would be no Nato, and if Nato were to disintegrate, this association would live on, more intimate and more closely knit probably than ever.

Ogdensburg and the Destroyer Deal were two parts of the same act: they brought the United States to the aid of Britain and Canada, struggling to save themselves from the Nazi tyranny. From these beginnings emerged the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, the convoy of cargo ships across the Atlantic, the massing of an American army in Britain, and the eventual downfall of Germany. Twice in this century the Germans have tried to destroy the Anglo-American partnership, only to be defeated and to see the partnership strengthened as a result of their efforts. Today, within Nato, the Germans themselves belong to that partnership and depend upon it for their survival.

During the war the ideal of "One World" seized hold of the popular imagination. Wendell Willkie, the Republican aspirant for the presidency, contributed more to this notion than any other single individual through his amazingly successful book by that name. Even President Roosevelt, who has been accused with considerable justice of fond dreams of friendship with the Soviets, was not so loquacious on the subject as his erstwhile Republican rival. "One World" in practice meant Mr. Roosevelt's famous "Four Policemen"—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and China—who would concert together. And it took shape in the United Nations Charter which the Russians signed, along with all the rest, at

San Francisco in 1945. The controlling elements under the Charter were the five great powers holding permanent seats on the Security Council; and the Charter provided for a Military Staff Committee made up of the chiefs of staff of the five powers, who were to direct the armed forces which the member nations were to place at their disposal.

But the Military Staff Committee soon vanished into the abyss of post-war quarrels between East and West, and "Two Worlds" have long since replaced "One World" as a popular fixation. The North Atlantic Council has taken the place of the Security Council as far as the West is concerned, and the defense forces of Nato are the substitute for the Military Staff Committee of the U.N.

Nato's Beginnings

The beginnings of Nato date from the Greco-Turkish crisis of March, 1947, which was the first great public break between the Soviets and the West. We know now that there was little cause during the war for the illusion of "One World," but the elaborate pretence and the painful hope that it would prove real were carefully nourished through the first year and a half of peace. Even Churchill's candid public warning at Fulton, Missouri, in March, 1946, failed to sink in, and public opinion continued for the remainder of the year to pin its faith on the Council of Foreign Ministers.

But the sudden necessity of rescuing Greece from communism and the Turkish Straits from Russian control blasted what hope was left, and the "Truman doctrine" gave verbal form to the concept of the free world pitted against the Communist world.

Richard W. Van Alstyne will spend the academic year 1960-1961 as Fulbright Lecturer in American Diplomatic History, University College, University of London, with the title of Honorary Research Associate. He is managing editor of *World Affairs Quarterly*. His latest book, *The Rising American Empire*, will be published this fall in England and New York simultaneously.

About the same time Britain and France, in their enfeebled and impoverished condition, signed a treaty of mutual defense at Dunkirk; and the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, expressed open discontent with the Security Council and hinted that Canada would like to see a new alignment among the Western countries.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the hard winter weather of 1946-1947, Western Europe tottered toward the brink of economic and social collapse. The American government began preparations for rendering aid on a scale comparable to wartime Lend-Lease, in the great Marshall Plan, which Secretary of State George C. Marshall outlined in a speech of June 5, 1947. During the ensuing ten months, while the European Recovery Program slowly took shape and Congress debated, came the final breach with Russia over Germany, Eastern Germany was secured inside the Iron Curtain and, most alarming at the time, a Communist regime came into power in Czechoslovakia. It was this striking demonstration of Communist aggression that finally induced the Republican Right wing in Congress to support the European Recovery Program.

Inauguration of the Marshall Plan in 1948 was the turning point; the miracle of European progress during the last decade stems from it. The European Common Market started with Benelux, the tariff union set up by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in January, 1948; Britain and France joined to form the Brussels Pact of March 17, 1948, the immediate forerunner of Nato. Unfortunately the Brussels Pact did not eventuate in a tariff union among the five countries so easily as was hoped. But it laid down the principle of mutual defense to be embodied a year later in the North Atlantic Treaty; and it was the first of a long series of steps which, in spite of certain setbacks, has carried Western Europe far along the road toward unity.

Political warfare accelerated by the Russians and pointed at Western Europe's efforts at self-help, and especially at driving the United States out of Europe, had just the opposite effect. The most threatening of the Soviet moves was the infamous Berlin blockade, which lasted more than a year and

(Continued on p. 138)

"...Nato finds itself in 1960 still seeking the answer to its strategic problem," notes this specialist, commenting that "Nato remains committed to the strategy of deterrence and retaliation." Is this policy sound? Here is an evaluation of Nato's military potential in guarding the security of the free world.

Nato's Strategic Dilemmas

By ALLAN S. NANES

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IN the course of its existence, Nato has faced and overcome a number of problems, some of which, such as Cyprus, subjected the organization to extreme pressure. Today Nato faces a problem more fundamental than any which have preceded it. Essentially it involves Nato's role in the nuclear-missile age. Does it serve a valid strategic purpose or not? If so, what strategy should it pursue? How can it best safeguard the security of its members? If its objective is to deter war, is it equipped as well as it might be to achieve that objective, or if world tensions actually erupt into conflict, can it give the West a reasonable hope of victory? If not, should it be abandoned, with each nation seeking to defend itself as best it can?

At its inception, Nato's strategic problem was hardly as difficult. After all, at that time the United States alone had the atomic

bomb, and the bomber force with which to deliver it. No less an authority than Winston Churchill attributed the Soviet's failure to attempt to overrun Europe with its huge land armies to this fact.¹ Thus Nato strategy was conceived essentially in terms of a holding operation. The so-called medium term plan called for the shifting of supply lines, so they would run perpendicular to the front instead of parallel, building airfields and increasing troop strength. A long term plan projected a build up against aggressive Soviet action.² If the Soviets attacked, Western ground forces would attempt to prevent the Russians from occupying Western Europe, while the finishing blow to the Soviet's home base was being struck by strategic American airpower.

While the United States maintained its monopoly of the atomic deterrent, the European members of Nato felt no compelling need to rearm or augment their forces, even though strategic plans may have called for this. Indeed, there is reason to believe that from their point of view the chief virtue of Nato lay in the American commitment to come to the defense of Western Europe.³ On the other hand, the chief threat to their security as they saw it lay not in the possibility of overt Soviet aggression, but rather in subversion, with the fate of Czechoslovakia as the prime example. Thus the first requirement for security was economic recovery.

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¹ Speech at M.I.T. convocation, March 31, 1949.

² Hilsman, Roger, in "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context," Ch. 2 of *NATO and American Security*, Klaus Knorr, ed., Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 15.

³ Osgood, Robert E., "NATO: Problems of Security and Collaboration," *American Political Science Review*, March, 1960, p. 108.

Nato's European members elaborated this order of priority because they felt relatively safe behind America's strategic deterrent.⁴

These comfortable assumptions were destined to be shattered by two events: first, the Soviet acquisition of a nuclear capability, and, second, the outbreak of the Korean War. The former, while it by no means cancelled out the value of America's deterrent, raised doubts as to whether we would ever use a nuclear capability if an attack upon the United States were not involved. Conversely, it was argued that if the United States did employ massive nuclear retaliation to free Europe from Soviet occupation, there might be no Europe left to free. This same problem, in a more sophisticated form, is with us today.

An Integrated Coalition

The Korean attack, on its part, seemed to indicate a new willingness by the Soviet Union to resort to force to achieve its goals. The response of Nato was to decide to rearm Germany, to establish a unified command structure, and to appoint a Supreme Commander, in short, to convert a guarantee pact into an integrated coalition.⁵ A goal of 96 divisions was approved by the Nato foreign ministers, meeting in Lisbon in 1952.

By the end of 1953 Nato was far from achieving that goal, but it had managed to muster sufficient strength to permit the adoption of what was known as the "forward strategy," which simply meant a plan to defend on a line east of the Rhine. The forces on the line were such that the Russians would have to reinforce before they could attack, thus giving warning of their intentions.⁶ Thus forewarned, Nato air-nuclear power could be brought into action, where its superiority would redress the inferiority of Nato ground forces and gain the verdict.

But the forward strategy was also dependent on the advent of tactical atomic weapons, which were supposed to neutralize Russia's great numerical advantage in troop strength. Obviously, however, two could play at that game as well as one, and having developed a hydrogen bomb of its own, the Soviet Union moved on to battlefield atomic weapons as well. The Russians built a bomber force which gave them the capability of

striking at our overseas bases, and offsetting our retaliatory power to a considerable degree. They continued to modernize and re-equip their forces. The result was to change the strategic situation, to Nato's disadvantage, just at the time it began to believe itself capable of coping with the Soviet challenge.⁷ This advantage was to persist, and even to increase, when the Algerian crisis decimated France's contribution to Nato's ground forces and the Soviets jumped off to an early lead in the missile race.

It may be observed that Nato's strategy in these earlier days was geared to a rather simple view of Soviet intentions. It seemed to envision a massive Soviet thrust which would have nothing less than the subjugation of all of Europe as its goal. In Western eyes Russia's maintenance of its huge land armies could serve no other purpose. It was this assumption which justified the policy of nuclear deterrence and retaliation, a policy open to serious question if the adversary's objectives were deemed more limited. But the Korean War, as we have mentioned, only strengthened the view that an overt Russian attempt to conquer Europe was a distinct possibility.

Strategic Possibilities

That possibility remains, of course, but it is now considered one of the least likely Soviet moves. The main reason for this lies in Soviet missile development, particularly intercontinental ballistic missiles. Even before the missiles' advent, Nato's defensive *raison d'être* meant that the strategic initiative was held by the Russians. They had a number of courses of action open to them even then, but their strategic flexibility is now greatly increased, for they can now strike in limited or unlimited fashion, or in some combination of the two, not only against the European members of Nato, but against the United States itself.

Indeed, one author has discerned the contingencies against which Nato must plan as follows: (1) an all out nuclear and thermonuclear war on Europe and the U. S.; (2) a massive coordinated assault with either

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁵ Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

conventional or battlefield nuclear weapons against the whole of Europe, but clearly limited to Europe; (3) a limited war that does not begin as an attack on the whole of Europe, but grows into a war for Europe; (4) missile or other blackmail singling out of a particular member of the Nato alliance and posing a threat that is total for that country, but limited as far as the rest of Nato is concerned; and (5) finally, a probing or punitive action, that is clearly limited for all concerned, both for the particular country against whom the attack is directed, and for Nato as a whole.⁸ Furthermore, since ICBM's give the Soviet Union the capability of striking directly at the United States and destroying its retaliatory power, without touching the European members of Nato at all, this possibility must likewise be taken into account. Surely if such an attack were ever launched, accompanied by firm assurances that no hostile action was intended against them, the European members of Nato would be under the most severe kind of pressure to desert the alliance.

Thus Nato's strategic task has undergone a change. It was originally designed to protect Europe against a large scale Soviet ground attack. For that purpose, the strategy of deterrence and retaliation, given America's atomic monopoly, was admirably suited. It also dovetailed neatly with the necessity of restoring the European economy to its normal state, after the devastation and dislocations caused by World War II, for sole possession of the nuclear weapon minimized the need for ground strength.

When the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear and thermonuclear capability, the West attempted to regain the edge through the development of battlefield nuclear weapons. But the Soviet Union drew abreast here too, and then the development of missiles shaped the strategic situation into its current form.

It would seem that the plethora of possible Soviet strategies would require that Nato develop varied capacities for response. Instead the strategy of reliance on the nuclear deterrent, elaborated prior to the advent of missiles, continued in force. That strategy had been reaffirmed in the "new look" adopted by the United States in 1953, which called for the reduction of ground

forces and greater stress on air-nuclear power. "This formula was to prove increasingly popular in allied governments as the prospect of substituting nuclear firepower for manpower gleamed brighter."⁹

Despite warnings, including those of Army generals,¹⁰ that United States' defense, and by implication Nato's, was being weakened by this tactic, the cuts in ground forces continued. The original force goal of 96 divisions, quickly trimmed to 50, was reduced again to 30. It was argued that a ground force of this size, equipped with battlefield atomic weapons, could cope with a quick and limited Soviet attack. The United States' retaliatory power would deal with anything larger. The criticism that the United States and the allies dependent upon its retaliatory power were committing themselves ever more deeply to a course of action whereby even minor intrusions might eventuate in all out nuclear war was overruled.

The policy of massive retaliation seemed vindicated, moreover, when the British government announced in 1957 that it would cut back its Army of the Rhine, and develop its own nuclear deterrent, to be used either independently or in conjunction with our own. Yet flattering as this declaration seemed to be to American policy, it had implications for Nato strategy about which the United States, as we shall see, could not be particularly enthusiastic.

Indeed, despite the outward agreement of Nato members on the strategy of nuclear deterrence and retaliation, it was becoming apparent that all criticism could not be ignored. This was particularly true after the utility of tactical atomic weapons became open to grave question. Rather than requiring less manpower, it was soon realized that they could well require more. Suppose, for example, that the Soviets attacked on the ground, using tactical atomic weapons. Casualty rates would be very high, great masses of troops would be needed to stem the thrust, and Nato's slim reserves would be quickly depleted. In short, to pursue such a strategy, Nato needed larger ground forces, not smaller ones.

⁸ Hilsman, Roger, "On NATO Strategy," in *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, Arnold Wolfers, ed., Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, p. 178.

⁹ Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹⁰ Generals Ridgway and Gavin, for example.

The tremendous expense involved in manufacturing these weapons was another factor which tended to depreciate their value. The result was a shift in emphasis from the defensive to the deterrent value of these weapons, but against a background which began to question the credibility of any tactical nuclear response to a conventional attack.¹¹ Thus critics said Nato strategy was reaching a dead end even before missiles appeared upon the scene. But if nuclear deterrence is still the basic principle of Nato strategy, it is obvious that a great deal of thinking is going on as to how it may best be adapted to the missile age.

Nato's Shield

One aspect of this thinking has been to revert to the idea of strengthening Nato's shield. The British, for example, have been reported to be greatly concerned about Nato's weakness on the crucial central front, which they attribute to insufficient French forces, coupled with the fact that German divisions are not yet ready.¹² As a result, Britain has been working to develop a high degree of professionalism among its 50,000 troops in Germany, and is training airborne brigades at home to reinforce this army in the event of Soviet attack.

General Norstad, too, has repeatedly urged upon the Nato powers whose forces he commands the necessity of the full 30 division shield instead of the 21.33 divisions now available. But the General is also on record as indicating that this shield should provide Nato with the means of meeting something less than an all out attack with something less than massive retaliation. Exclusive reliance on massive retaliation, he has stated, will result in Nato's being "piece-mealed to death."¹³

The trouble is that while General Norstad recognized that Nato needs the capability of fighting a limited, conventional war, and while recognition of this need has been voiced in other quarters, Nato officially takes no cognizance of the possibility of such a conflict.¹⁴ The consistent unwillingness of Nato members to raise sufficient ground troops and the consequent employment of tactical atomic weapons have virtually imprisoned Nato strategy within the frame of nuclear deterrence and, failing that, massive

retaliation. Furthermore, since General Norstad has said that the 30 division force goal is a minimum, one can suppose that even if it is reached there will be little change in the strategic picture.

Nuclear Sharing

The advent of missiles, and the concomitant increase in Soviet flexibility which has been pointed out, have aggravated Nato's strategic dilemma. One solution which has been advanced has been that of nuclear sharing. Ideally, from the point of view of America's Nato allies, such sharing would provide for American transfer of nuclear weapons to their control. Our law, of course, forbids this, but ever since 1954 it has been our policy (ironically, in view of the actual course of Nato strategy) to provide the forces of our allies with a "dual capability," that is, the ability to wage a conventional or nuclear struggle. To that end we have furnished Honest John, Matador and Mace missiles to the West Germans, and the Honest John to the Italians.¹⁵ In addition, Britain and Italy have accepted American intermediate range ballistic missiles for use by their forces. There are four bases for the Thor IRBM in Britain, and two bases are being constructed in Italy for the Jupiter. On Nato's flank, a Jupiter base is projected in Turkey. Each IRBM base should house 15 missiles.¹⁶ However, the nuclear warheads with which all these weapons are capable of being fitted remain in American custody.

However this combination of the Nato shield plus American missiles doesn't meet the requirements of those in each country who want independent nuclear strength.¹⁷ With a deterrent of their own they feel they can stand up to Soviet nuclear blackmail, while at the same time they would have protection should the United States decide, in a showdown, to let Europe go rather than involve itself in nuclear catastrophe.

¹¹ Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

¹² The *N.Y. Times*, March 30, 1960, p. 4.

¹³ Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ King, James E., Jr., "That 'Fourth Nuclear Power,'" *The New Republic*, March 21, 1960, p. 9.

¹⁶ *The Soviet Union and the Nato Powers, The Military Balance*, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1960, p. 7.

¹⁷ Hilsman, "On Nato Strategy," *op. cit.*, p. 179.

The Independent Deterrent

But this policy of the independent deterrent is open to serious objection on several counts. Politically, it would add a powerful element to the ever present centrifugal pressures within Nato.¹⁸ Economically, it would be enormously expensive, and as the experience of Britain illustrates, probably too expensive for any member of the alliance other than the United States. Furthermore, it would mean a number of additions to the "nuclear club," with attendant complications for world security and peace of mind.

But more important, there is the question as to whether an independent deterrent would actually have any value. Certainly there is little reason to suppose that any Nato member would risk the consequences of nuclear warfare more readily than would the United States. If this is so, it is difficult to see what strategic purpose is served by the independent deterrent.

The Nato Deterrent

A more appealing concept is that of the Nato deterrent. Under it, Nato as an organization, rather than each individual country, would deploy its own nuclear missiles. Thus its use would theoretically be the result of an allied, rather than a national decision. Unfortunately, however, the Nato deterrent possesses the same drawbacks as its independent brother. It might prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons in Western Europe, but might encourage their spread among the Warsaw Pact countries.¹⁹

Nor is there reason to believe that it would facilitate speedier action by the Nato command in the event of an emergency. True, under the present system General Norstad would have to clear the use of the deterrent with the Nato governments, but with a Nato deterrent the same condition would obtain. In both instances, this requirement may have to be disregarded in a crisis. In short a Nato deterrent gives Nato no greater political control over its military arm than exists at the present time.

Despite criticism of the independent or Nato deterrent, the idea of an independent nuclear capability for Nato retains a good deal of attraction. This seems particularly true of the press, which is somewhat given to

speculation along these lines. Thus when General Norstad disclosed plans for a Nato nuclear striking force made up of a battalion each from the United States, Britain, and France, the rumor was given currency that this meant that nuclear weapons were to be given to Nato countries, although General Norstad had told a congressional committee that this was not to be the case.²⁰

The general's plans for this force are evidence of the fact that the Nato command is still grappling with the problem of how to meet something less than an all out Soviet assault. Obviously the "fire brigade" just mentioned is needed to deal with pressures on its members who might not be in a position to meet them with adequate local defense whether conventional or nuclear.²¹ But the question still arises as to the wisdom of meeting limited conventional attacks with a limited nuclear response. Might this not touch off a countering nuclear response, spiraling on into holocaust? Whether it would or not, Nato seems committed to such a strategy. The British Labour M.P., Denis Healey, has criticized this commitment, and called for a non-atomic strategy for Nato, by which he means a policy of conventional defense, backed up by United States atomic striking power, coupled with military and political ties to Western Europe.²²

Thus Nato finds itself in 1960 still seeking the answer to its strategic problems. In an era when "the increasing dominance of the man who strikes first must be taken really seriously if any deterrent is to be maintained,"²³ Nato remains committed to the strategy of deterrence and retaliation. There is some question as to whether its conventional forces can cope with conventional attack, combined with the realization that the use of tactical nuclear weapons is a two-edged sword. There is the fear, reflected in the sentence just quoted, that the

¹⁸ For example, General Billotte of France, has spoken of France's atomic capability as a "continental deterrent," implying that Anglo-American nuclear power would be used only in the event of aggression against its possessors. See *Washington Post and Times Herald*, March 20, 1960, p. A6.

¹⁹ *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Air Edition, Vol. 82, No. 17, April 28, 1960, p. 8.

²⁰ See *The N.Y. Times*, March 11, 1960 pp. 1 and 4, and March 12, 1960, p. 4.

²¹ King, "That 'Fourth Nuclear Power,'" *op. cit.*

²² Healey, Denis, "A Non-Atomic Strategy for Nato," *New Leader*, March 7, 1960, p. 7.

²³ *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Air Edition, Vol. 82, No. 16, April 21, 1960, p. 1.

weapons of deterrence will not really deter. Indeed, that there is much validity to this sentiment in the missile age is borne out by Britain's abandonment of its *Blue Streak* weapon, as much because of the vulnerability of its fixed bases as because of the economic factor. To maintain an effective deterrent, Nato would have to support a "second strike" force, involving an airborne alert, missile-firing submarines, railborne missile launching devices, and so forth. The theory is that enough such retaliatory power would survive any Soviet first strike to make it too expensive for the U.S.S.R. to launch any such strike at all. American defense planning seems to be moving in this direction, and the presumption is that as it does, Nato planning will do so too.

(Continued from p. 132)

which impelled the United States to engage in major operations that brought a Soviet capitulation in May, 1949. The termination of this blockade preceded by only a month the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, committing the United States to the permanent defense of Western Europe.

And it was at this time too that the West German Federal Republic was set up, under

Yet perhaps these strategic dilemmas will never come to a head. Certainly in recent months the Soviet Union has indicated repeatedly that it is shifting its attack on the United States world position to the economic field. In fact, the United States Army has gone so far as to publish an official analysis in which it states that the Russians are not undertaking to build the force needed to carry out a surprise nuclear attack on the United States.²⁴ If these statements are borne out by the course of events, then both Nato and the United States can breathe easier. Until then, however, both must continue the search for an allied strategy that is viable.

²⁴ *The N.Y. Times*, May 5, 1960, p. 1.

the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, to be followed almost immediately by the establishment of the East German Democratic Republic. Since this eventful year (1949), Nato has moved somewhat into the background—it has suffered from the differences and the separatist tendencies of its principal members. But the purpose for which it was founded is today as vital as it was then.

"The growth of federal power and the relative decline of the state raises some basic questions. What is happening to the values of the old decentralized federalism . . . ?

"Now, we must beware of exaggeration and over-statement. The federal system is being modified in the direction of greater federal power, but it is not becoming extinct. Institutions are tenacious things, and they are transformed slowly, gradually. Local governments for experimentation, adaptation, apprenticeship in political leadership, and training for democratic citizenship will continue to function. The states will continue to create and maintain counties and cities for local government. The states will continue to use the counties as agencies for the administration of state matters, though not as much as formerly, for the state today tends to administer more of its own functions directly and not indirectly. The states will continue to give their own grants-in-aid to the counties—so that the state will increasingly spend federal money it does not collect and collect state money it does not spend. The states will continue to exercise many powers independently of the federal government. Even where the federal government starts exercising a power formerly exercised exclusively by the state, the federal government does not always preempt the field, and thus cooperative federalism comes to operate in a wider way. . . . And finally, the states will continue to administer the joint federal-state projects under the federal government's expanding grants-in-aid programs."

—William G. Carleton, Professor of Political Science, University of Florida, in an address delivered August 5, 1959.

“Domination of Western Europe by the Russians, while it might not mean our immediate downfall, would almost certainly turn the tide of the protracted world conflict irreversibly against the West.” Tracing the development of United States policy with respect to Nato and Nato’s importance for the United States, this author maintains that “The United States must shake off the ‘maginot line’ complex which the advent of nuclear weapons has induced.” A change in Nato strategy is indicated and “it is up to the United States as the leader of the Atlantic alliance to chart the course.”

Nato: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy

By ALVIN J. COTTRELL

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THE entry of the United States into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) in April, 1949, was the most significant event in the history of United States foreign relations. Prior to that time, in two world wars, the United States had served as a kind of strategic reserve for the Western democracies. It was not until the United States in peacetime aligned itself formally with the principal nations of Western Europe that it became clear that the defense of Western Europe was considered synonymous with the defense of the United States.

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Nato was the West's response to a number of ominous postwar moves by the Soviet Union which seemed to presage an imminent Communist military thrust into Western Europe. By 1948, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania had been completely incorporated into the Soviet empire. Turkey and Iran were under persistent Soviet pressure, and Greece had been the victim of a Communist guerrilla attack which was finally defeated by American military assistance under the Truman Doctrine. But perhaps the most significant catalyst of the alliance was the forcible overthrow of the Czechoslovakian government in 1948 by internal Communist forces, backed by the Red Army. As Paul-Henri Spaak has said:

The determining factor in international politics after the Second World War was the coup d'état in Prague. The replacement of a democratic, progressive regime by a totalitarian government dominated by a communist minority deserves a singularly important place in postwar history. The tragedy of Czechoslovakia was the bolt of lightning which roused the West. After 1948, everyone in Western Europe and in the New World understood that the Western countries, for their own safety, had to unite and make clear to Soviet Russia that Prague was the last act of Soviet imperialism on the European continent which we would tolerate.¹

¹ “The Atlantic Community and Nato,” *Orbis*, Vol. I, No. 4, Winter, 1958, p. 411.

In joining Nato, the United States sought to prevent the absorption of Western Europe into the Soviet Empire. As Nato has grown in strength, however, a more immediate danger has been its neutralization as a result of Soviet psychological-diplomatic strategy. If Western Europe were neutralized, the region's vast resources would be effectively denied to the Free World. To the extent that the Soviets have refrained from direct military aggression, Nato can be said to have been successful.

It may be argued that the case for Nato's success has not yet been proved because there is no tangible evidence that the Soviets ever planned a direct military assault on Western Europe. We must always bear in mind, however, that what the Soviets do or do not do is intimately related to our own actions. Some of the greatest achievements in history tend to be minimized precisely because they headed off spectacular action; in politics as in medicine, prevention is always less dramatic than the cure. Suffice it to say that Nato, backed by the United States Strategic Air Command operating from a ring of bases around the Soviet heartland of communism, has provided a formidable deterrent to a potential Soviet thrust to the English Channel throughout the postwar period.

Nato's Importance for the U.S.

We would be in error, however, if we viewed Nato's value to the United States as little more than that of a formal military alliance for the declared purpose of defending Western Europe. As vital as the objective may be to the success of American foreign policy, it is by no means the only one. No one has argued the case for Nato's over-all importance to the United States more eloquently than former Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, one of its principal architects. Speaking before an audience of U.S. Reserve Officers at the National War College during July, 1959, Mr. Acheson pointed out that the United States alone cannot cope with the formidable problems facing us in all areas of the globe.

There are today, this side of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, two great centers of power: the United States and Western Europe. If the United States, as the leader of the Western World, is to prevent the further

shift of power eastward to the Communist bloc and to deal successfully with proliferating problems of awaking continents, then it can do so only in cooperation with Western Europe. It is not, as Mr. Acheson took pains to explain, that we consider Europeans superior as a people to those inhabiting the under-developed nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The problem, he said, is rather one of priorities: if we are to help the newly emerging nations, as we must, the first priority is the effective organization of the primary resources of the Western World—the resources of Western Europe and America. This reasoning goes far to explain the vehemence with which Acheson has attacked the various theories of "disengagement" in Europe which have been fashionable in recent years. In his own words:

One does not become stronger by becoming weaker—a principle which seems to have been embraced by the advocates of disengagement. Under present circumstances, there can be no effective unity between Western Europe and North America if the very pillar of this relationship, namely Nato's forward position in Europe, is removed. Therefore, if West Germany should be neutralized, disarmed and wrested from the Western Alliance, then the dissolution of the alliance is only a question of time, leaving us no place to make our stand except in the United States. And we cannot solve the problems of the world from Fortress America. If the Atlantic nations were truly united, then many of the problems of the day would become less intricate.²

Incidentally, it was the primacy of Europe in United States foreign policy which was a key factor leading Acheson to oppose the extension of the Korean War into Manchuria. He believed, rightly or wrongly, that such a policy would inevitably lead to our over-involvement in Asia at the expense or even to the detriment of our commitments in Western Europe.

Domination of Western Europe by the Russians, while it might not mean our immediate downfall, would almost certainly turn the tide of the protracted world conflict irreversibly against the West. Henry A. Kissinger has stated trenchantly:

If Eurasia were to be dominated by a hostile power or group of powers, we would confront

² "The Premises of American Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, Vol. III, No. 3, Fall, 1959, p. 273.

an overpowering threat. And the key to Eurasia is Western Europe because its loss would bring with it the loss of the Middle East and the upheaval of Africa. Were this to happen, the strategic advantage in all-out war would shift to the U. S. S. R. If the United States were ever confined to "Fortress America," or even if Soviet expansion went far enough to sap our allies' will to resist, the Western Hemisphere would be confronted by three-quarters of mankind and hardly less of its resources and our continued existence would be precarious. At best we would be forced into a military effort incompatible with what is now considered the American way of life.³

The Berlin Crisis

But despite its broader importance as the keystone of American foreign policy, Nato cannot survive unless it meets the test of providing Europe with military security. Nothing makes this clearer than the present crisis over Berlin. The Soviet threat to Berlin is part of a larger strategy designed to paralyze Nato. By challenging the Western alliance in Berlin—one of the West's militarily most vulnerable forward positions—Moscow seeks to demonstrate to Western Europe and, indeed, to the world, that America's strategic nuclear capabilities have been neutralized by Soviet missile progress and that American military power can no longer be counted on to defend the Free World.

Hence, Berlin may be the *first* real test of Nato's cohesion and strength as a military alliance. If Nato fails to cope with this challenge it may be its *last*. The psychological implications of a Western back down over Berlin might well prove fatal to the alliance. It might, for example, set in motion political trends in West Germany which would put in question West Germany's continued adherence to the alliance.

The Sword and the Shield

Nato strategy thus far has rested on the concept of the "Sword" (Sac) and the "Shield" (Nato's ground forces) stationed in the center of Europe. Throughout the entire period of Nato's existence, however, this "shield" has been woefully inadequate to cope with a large-scale Soviet ground attack. Rather, the forces making up the "shield" have served as a "tripwire" to activate the Sac "sword," which is outside the command

of Nato. But, as the Soviets began in 1949 to develop their own nuclear stockpiles and thus to whittle down American nuclear superiority, our Western allies have been increasingly apprehensive of a possible failure of our strategy of deterrence. Denis Healey, military specialist of the British Labour party, gave this view of the emerging situation in 1957:

Now, however, new uncertainties are clouding the European response to NATO's demands. The instrument of America's atomic striking power—the Strategic Air Command—has always been held outside of NATO under the exclusive control of the United States. So long as Russia lacked a comparable power, the presence of a few G. I.'s along the Iron Curtain seemed sufficient guarantee that America would commit the Strategic Air Command to action if Western Europe were attacked. Now that Russia may have the power to retaliate in kind on the United States itself, can the peoples of Western Europe take it for granted that America will invite her destruction by committing the Strategic Air Command to their support?⁴

What Mr. Healey says about the future utility of Sac applies with equal validity to all the missile systems which the United States is now in the process of developing. Concern for the continued reliability of the American strategic retaliatory force for deterring an attack on individual Nato countries has prompted Alastair Buchan, Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, to propose the creation forthwith of "the least vulnerable" Nato strategic nuclear force. Buchan proposes the creation of an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile system deployed along the entire periphery of the Nato area from "North Cape to Alexandretta," under the direct control of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe (Saceur) or some other suitable command.⁵

At the root of Nato's weakness is its inability to respond to the most likely threat. The strategy to which Nato is committed was formulated during the period when the United States enjoyed a clear-cut superiority over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons

³ Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York: Harper and Bros., 1958, pp. 269-270.

⁴ Denis Healey, "NATO and the Cold War," *Confluence*, Vol. 6, Fall, 1957, p. 222.

⁵ Alastair Buchan, *NATO in the 60's*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, p. 71.

and the means of delivery. Yet, as has been noted, this superiority is waning.

The West's ability to deter a Communist attack on Western Europe may soon depend almost entirely on the strength of Nato's ground forces stationed in central and western Europe. As we have stated above, these ground forces have never been adequate to repel the massive ground attack that the Soviets are capable of launching. Of the 30 divisions called for by Saceur no more than 15 are in position and ready to fight. Despite reported Soviet troop cuts, these forces confront approximately 22 Soviet divisions in East Germany and over 100 more stationed elsewhere in East Europe and European Russia. The Soviet forces are equipped to wage both nuclear and non-nuclear warfare. By contrast, the Nato forces, by dint of their size and armament, are committed almost entirely to a nuclear defense.

Lisbon Force Goals

In the early days of Nato, the United States believed it possible to erect a conventional force barrier against a potential Soviet thrust across the Elbe River. At Lisbon in 1952, the Nato Council adopted a force goal of 96 divisions. Of these, the forward force apparently was to consist of between 35 and 40 divisions. However, only 25 of these divisions representing the forward screen were to be positioned on the vital central front—a line extending from the Baltic Sea in the North to the border of Switzerland in the South;⁶ the others were to be distributed largely in the Trieste-Brenner Pass area and along the Scandinavian front. The remainder of the 96 divisions were to be manned by reservists and to be ready to fight from "D + 15" to "D + 30."

The Norstad Goal

The present Nato force goals call for 30 ready divisions on the central front—5 more than under the Lisbon plan—and a considerable number of reserve divisions, but not so many as had been envisaged at Lisbon. It has been estimated that, counting reserve divisions, the total number of divisions currently called for is in the neighborhood of 75.⁷ Thus the disparity between the Lisbon force goals and the force now deemed de-

sirable by General Norstad is not so great as would seem at first glance. The principal difference between the Lisbon plan and the Norstad goals seems to be the latter's emphasis on the ready force to be deployed at all times along the central front and its de-emphasis of reserve forces.

An important reason behind this shift in emphasis is the doubt by many Nato planners that a local war in Europe would stay limited very long. Estimates on how long a Soviet attack can be contained without flaring into general war vary from several days to one month. It is just such estimates which have led to the recent British proposal to Nato that the mobilization base of the Alliance be reduced from 90 days to a maximum of one month. It is the view of British leaders that either general nuclear war or the return to negotiations would limit a local conflict in Europe to no more than one month.⁸

The rationale behind the size of the shield to be in position on the central front is easily explained. The size of the shield has always been intimately related to the size of the Soviet force poised in East Germany—a force which now approximates 22 divisions. The idea is to have in position on the central front line, i.e., from the Baltic Sea to the Swiss border, a force adequate to cope with the Soviet forward force in East Germany. In short, the Nato force goal envisages a ready force which would make it impossible for the Soviet forces in East Germany to carry out a successful surprise attack on Western Europe without heavy reinforcement—and, in the view of Nato planners, the Soviets could not increase substantially their forces in East Germany without thereby giving the West valuable warning time and enabling Nato to bring up its own reinforcements.

In short, a Soviet attack in the force necessary to overwhelm 30 Nato divisions would have to be so large as to make Soviet intentions unmistakably clear. A "shield" of 30 divisions would be adequate to force upon the Soviets what Saceur has termed "the

⁶ Roger Hilsman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Concept," in *NATO and American Security*, Klaus Knorr, ed., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 29-34.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *The New York Times*, March 30, 1960.

pause." In other words, it is hoped that a Communist ground probe could be contained long enough to give the Kremlin time to weigh the question as to whether it is willing to proceed further along a course that could lead to general war to achieve its objectives or whether it might be more prudent to return to the conference table.

Moreover, the Soviets would have to accept the risk that a large-scale ground probe into Nato territory might provoke the United States into striking the first nuclear blow, an advantage which is now generally conceded to the Soviet Union. If a nuclear holocaust is likely to be the logical result of a ground probe, then the Soviets might consider such an operation a foolish and costly prelude to general war.

The New Look

An important and controversial change in Nato strategy took place in 1954. Soon after it took office in 1953, the Eisenhower Administration announced the "New Look" in American defense policy, namely a policy of placing primary reliance on nuclear weapons to meet the full range of Communist conflict challenges. We are still pursuing this strategy today. Its effect has been to reduce sharply the level of conventional forces and increase the level of nuclear air forces, a policy widely referred to as "a bigger bang for a buck."

In December, 1954, the Nato Council incorporated the "New Look" into Nato strategy when it scaled down the over-all Lisbon force goals and integrated nuclear weapons into Nato strategy in order to compensate for the projected loss of conventional man and firepower. The new strategy has caused a great deal of concern within the Alliance. Aside from the physical dangers to our friends on both sides of the Iron Curtain inherent in nuclear strategy, there is the question, also, of the psychological implications of the new weapons. There is considerable doubt in many quarters that nuclear weapons can be used without spiraling a limited war into general war. This problem has been summed up by Captain Carl H. Amme, U.S.N.:

Deterrence is in effect a psychological posture. We attempt to create in the Soviet mind a fear or a belief in our willingness to act. Certainly no rational enemy would deny that we would

have the will to employ nuclear weapons if the stakes were right. On the other hand, we would hardly conceive that we would be irrational enough to use these weapons when the stakes were minute.⁹

Lack of Flexibility

Indeed, our troubles in Berlin stem largely from the inadequacy of Nato strategy. As Soviet nuclear-missile development progressively neutralizes United States strategic power, the large Soviet conventional force in Europe is being used as a wedge against the Western position in Berlin. If the West cannot deal with the Soviet threat to Berlin it will probably die of inanition. For a strategy of reliance on nuclear weapons does not endow Western diplomacy with the flexibility required to deal with the threat, implicit in Soviet ultimatums since the Berlin crisis began, of a blockade of Berlin imposed by East German forces. This is not to deny the importance of nuclear arms. We need them if only because our opponents have them. We will, of course, have to resort to them if conventional limitations fail to hold. But many are of the opinion—the present writer included—that nuclear weapons should be integrated into our forces in such a way as to enable us, at least at the outset of hostilities, to engage in a ground action without automatically resorting to their use.

The willingness to take risks is largely a measure of being prepared for all possible eventualities. Largely because of the inferiority of their conventional forces, for example, the Nato countries could not take advantage of the Soviet predicament during the Hungarian rising in 1956. Our failure to exploit Communist difficulties in Hungary in 1956 was largely due to the fact that, having geared our Nato strategy exclusively to nuclear armaments, we were afraid that any effort to exploit the Soviet dilemma in Hungary (such as warning the Soviets not to intervene or even recognizing Imre Nagy's government) would lead to war with the Soviet Union—a war which, given our strategy of primary reliance on nuclear weapons, could only have been a nuclear one. A successful psychological strategy against

⁹ Amme, Captain Carl H., "Psychological Effects of Nuclear Weapons," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, Vol. 86, April, 1960, p. 33.

communism's most vulnerable position, namely Eastern Europe, requires a military establishment which is flexible enough to allow us to take calculated risks.¹⁰

In short, only a comprehensive array of forces can provide Western diplomacy in Europe with adequate military support. United States ability to deliver an unacceptably high level of damage on the Soviet homeland will continue to be indispensable to deter an attack on the continental United States and thus to deter general nuclear war. But, if we are to prevent the absorption of Western Europe into the Soviet bloc or its effective neutralization, we must present the Soviets with a military posture which is more credible than the threat to destroy the Soviet Union in response to any Soviet "pinprick" into Western Europe.

Certainly, the forces now available to Nato in Western Europe do not provide the Supreme Commander with the flexibility he needs. As noted above, Nato has only about 15 combat ready divisions, and even this estimate depends largely on what one defines as "combat ready." The equivalent of 5 American divisions in Bavaria are probably the best equipped and trained forces in Nato.

Inadequate Non-Nuclear Shield

Despite the change wrought in the balance of power by the growing Soviet nuclear missile arsenal, the United States has continued to base its Nato military policy on the assumption that the Soviet Union is aware that Western Europe is so vital to American foreign policy that any attack on the Nato countries would automatically lead to general war.¹¹ And since, as the reasoning goes, the Russians have as little desire as we to detonate a nuclear holocaust, the West needs very little in the way of limited war capabilities for the defense of the area. Thus, for strategic reasons which happen to jibe conveniently with economic preconceptions, only half-hearted efforts have been made to develop a realistic war capability. This policy has had considerable bearing on the unwillingness of our European allies to make a sizeable contribution to the "shield." In the words of Denis Healey:

It is not surprising that the European peoples have made so inadequate an effort to provide

the troops demanded by SHAPE. If major aggression in Europe is going to lead to all-out thermonuclear war, why bother about holding a line in a radioactive desert? Moreover, if the Russians are convinced that a major aggression in Europe will lead to atomic retaliation by the Strategic Air Command, they will either refrain from such aggression altogether or start with an all-out attack on Strategic Air Command bases all over the world. In other words, by basing Western defense on the idea of massive retaliation, NATO appeared to deny America's allies any real role in their own defense—except in circumstances so catastrophic that defense hardly seemed worthwhile.¹²

This is not to say that our allies are blameless. They have seized upon the inconsistencies in our strategic doctrine as a convenient alibi for their own failure to make the difficult but necessary economic and political decisions. As Henry A. Kissinger has pointed out:

Our continental allies have been torn between a strategy of limited risk and the desire for economy, between the wish for protection against Soviet occupation and the reluctance to face harsh realities. Each economy measure has been justified, much as in the U.S., by the argument that the new weapons permit a reduction of forces. Yet the more fearful the resulting strategy, the more it has emphasized the sense of impotence among our allies.¹³

The supposedly high cost of conventional armaments is the reason most frequently advanced in United States policy circles for Nato's failure to maintain an adequate non-nuclear shield. But one of the foremost American military writers, Dr. Malcolm Hoag of Rand, in a new and comprehensive study on Nato's needs and capabilities states: "one can only argue that strategically acceptable alternatives [to a conventional capability] are unlikely to be any cheaper." Dr. Hoag contends that if the United States and

¹⁰ Cottrell, Alvin J., and Hahn, Walter F., "Needed: A New NATO Shield," in *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*, Hahn, Walter F., and Neff, John C., eds., New York, Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1960, Chapter 20.

¹¹ This premise may soon no longer be valid. Roger Hilsman points out that the loss of Europe prior to the missile age would have been tantamount to a final defeat for the U.S. "The Soviets must recognize this, and it would seem unlikely that they would launch such an attack without forestalling U.S. reprisal by a strike on SAC bases and the continental U.S. But the coming of missiles will sharply reduce the strategic significance of Europe for the defense of the continental U.S., and the Soviets may not regard the high psychological stake the U.S. has in Europe as sufficient motive for transforming a purely European war into the ultimate one." *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

¹² Denis Healey, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-222.

¹³ Henry A. Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

its Western allies were to design an adequate nuclear strategy for Nato—one which would enable Nato to engage in a limited nuclear war with the Russians in Europe—such a strategy would be “tremendously expensive,” especially if such a strategy were based on a second-strike capability. He proposes that nuclear weapons be relegated to a secondary position for meeting challenges in the Nato area and that Nato forego weapons such as surface to surface missiles which are so inaccurate as to be useless in non-nuclear conflict.¹⁴

The United States decision to place primary reliance on nuclear weapons was born of despair that Nato could ever achieve adequate conventional force levels to deal with a Soviet ground attack. In opting for a nuclear strategy, however, the West chose to ignore its inherent material and demographic superiority over the Soviet Union and its satellites. The disparity between Communist and Western forces in the European theater is due not to a disparity of resources, but rather to a lack of will on the part of the Nato countries and to some extent to the American strategic precepts. A few statistics will make this fact clear. At present, the United States has 31 million fit males of military age; the Soviet Union has 41 million. By 1965, it has been estimated that the available manpower figure for the United States will have risen to 35.2 million as compared with the slight increase to 41.5 million for the Soviets. If Nato is included, the West's relative position is even better. The Soviet bloc (excluding China) has 58.4 million fit males; Nato has 85.4 million. By 1965, this ratio will be 59 million versus 95.4 million.

It would be wishful thinking to expect the members of the Atlantic Alliance to draw on their superior reserves of manpower in order to match the Soviet ground strength man-for-man. But so extensive an effort may not be necessary. It is possible that a 30-division Nato “shield” will be adequate to deter a Soviet ground probe in terms of forcing the Soviets to go all out or attempt nothing at all. It is important to bear in mind, however, that even the goal of 30 Nato ready divisions was agreed upon when the United States held a clear strategic nuclear advantage. Thirty divisions would not be an adequate “shield” to cope with the en-

tire force which the Soviets now presumably have mobilized in a protracted engagement. In short, the 30-division “shield” can be adequate only if the invulnerability of American striking capabilities is maintained.


The role of nuclear weapons in strategy thus far has been largely psychological. They are indispensable as a deterrent against general war, but they are already inadequate to deal with Soviet gambits which fall below the threshold of a clear issue of American survival. With the approach of a mutual strategic invulnerability in nuclear delivery systems, an American threat of all-out nuclear war will remain a credible counter to a rapidly diminishing range of Communist diplomatic-psychological-military pressures and probes. Under such conditions, it will tax the energies of the United States and its Nato allies to convince the Communists of our willingness to implement an all-out nuclear response to Soviet gambits. Indeed, the increasing Soviet acquisition of long-range delivery systems may make direct Communist military action highly probable in the not too distant future.

The United States must continue to press for the increase—as soon as possible—and at a minimum—of Nato forces to the 30 ready divisions called for by Saceur. In addition there is a need for approximately 60 reserve divisions capable of rapid mobilization. At least one-third of the reserve forces should be ready for battle on D-plus-one-week. These forces should have a “dual capability,” i.e., they should be able to fight with or without nuclear weapons. The bulk of these forces should be supplied by European Nato members. But the United States, as a token of its commitment to a new Nato strategy and as an incentive to the European members to make a greater contribution, might increase its’ commitments to Nato by one division. The United States’ principal contribution, however, should be in the form of highly mobile forces.

Also, the United States should reconsider whether it might not be wise, despite the obvious risks involved, to make available to its Nato allies adequate nuclear capabilities in order to avoid costly duplication of developmental effort and the diversion of scarce re-

¹⁴ “Interdependence for NATO,” *World Politics*, Vol. 12, April, 1960, p. 386.

MAP OF THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES



—Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, *Handbook on Arms Control and Related Problems in Europe, Excerpts and Summaries of Official and Unofficial Proposals*, Wash., D.C., Government Printing Office, May, 1959.

sources from the creation of the required ground forces needed to implement the strategy adumbrated above. In the case of France such a policy might contribute towards creating the necessary political-psychological soil for our diplomatic and military strategies. Greater trust in France implicit in a reversal of our nuclear policy toward Europe might go far towards salving de Gaulle's feelings, with gains for the entire alliance.¹⁵

There may not be much time left in which to make the needed changes in Nato strategy and the requisite increases in Nato force levels to implement it. But if there is to be a change in Nato strategy, it is up to the

United States as the leader of the Atlantic alliance to chart the course. The United States must shake off the "maginot line" complex which the advent of nuclear weapons has induced. If the United States fails to make the necessary adjustment in Nato strategy dictated by the changes in the world military balance, Western Europe will be increasingly at the mercy of Soviet military-psychological strategy and Western diplomacy will lose what little freedom of choice it still commands.

¹⁵ Cf. The Recommendations of United States Foreign Policy-Western Europe, A Study Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, October 15, 1959.

"Nato is undoubtedly a manifestation of the cold war but the cold war is, in turn, a manifestation of the international class war which began over 40 years ago when the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia. The Communist attitude toward Nato is based on certain Communist theories and the strategy and tactics used against Nato are very similar to the strategy and tactics used against other organizations of which the Communists were not members. The following pages relate to the antecedents of the Communist attitude toward Nato and to the propaganda themes and other measures used against this unexpectedly stable union of the non-Communist countries of the Atlantic area. The responses to Communist attacks are touched on only incidentally."

Nato, Russia and the Cold War

By HAROLD H. FISHER

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ON APRIL 1, 1949, 13 days after the publication of the text of the North Atlantic Treaty, *Izvestia* and *The New York Times* carried the text of a memorandum in which the Soviet government told the world why it disapproved so heartily of this treaty. The objections, in brief, were these:

The treaty was not for self-defense, as was claimed, but was obviously aggressive and directed against the U.S.S.R. because the U.S.S.R. was the only great power which was excluded from the treaty;

The treaty did not contribute to peace and international security and was counter to the principles and aims of the United Nations, which was thereby being undermined;

The treaty was designed to intimidate the states which do not obey the commands of the Anglo-American bloc of powers, which lay claim to world domination;

This treaty, unlike the Soviet bilateral treaties which are for defense against a revival of German aggression, is a multilateral treaty that creates a closed grouping from which the Soviet Union was excluded, and therefore the treaty must be regarded as directed against the U.S.S.R., one of the chief allies of the United States, Great Britain and France in the anti-Hitlerite coalition.

And finally this treaty runs counter to Soviet treaties with Great Britain (1942), with France (1944) and to agreements with the United States and Great Britain made at Yalta and Potsdam.

Communist View of the World

The Communists' attitude toward Nato was in line with certain familiar theories, and the arguments used to discredit Nato were similar to the propaganda tactics used on several previous occasions. Among these theories are the following:

1. Since the October Revolution, the world has been divided into two camps; the camp of socialism, progress and peace and the camp of capitalism, imperialism and war. Because of this division any grouping of non-Communist ruled states could be for one purpose only—to make war on the camp of so-

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cialism which, until after World War II, was made up of the several republics of what at first was called the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and later the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

2. The capitalists, opposed to the camp of socialism, were bound, Lenin observed, to show two tendencies: (a) a tendency to unite against the Socialist camp and (b) a tendency for one capitalist state to struggle against another. The capitalists found it easier to struggle with one another than to unite. For this reason, Lenin explained on another occasion, his party had been able to retain power from 1918 to 1922 when it was very weak. The capitalists had not been able to unite because of deeply rooted fundamental economic struggles among themselves.

The members of the capitalist camp would be unable ever to combine effectively against the Socialist camp because of three fundamental contradictions often mentioned by the Communists as assuring their final victory. The three contradictions were: workers against capitalists; individual imperialist powers against other imperialist powers; and imperialist great powers against colonies and semi-colonies. These basic contradictions the capitalists could not overcome because of the nature of capitalism, which, the Communists apparently believed, had frozen at its highest point of development at the time of World War I when Lenin wrote *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*.

But before they became the victims of their inescapable contradictions, the capitalists could make a lot of trouble because they would try to overcome their selfish rivalries and unite, at least long enough to destroy their most dangerous enemy—the camp of socialism. Communist strategy, obviously, was to adopt policies that would prevent, delay or render ineffective any union that the capitalists might try to form within their camp. These policies may be summarized in this way:

1. Since, according to the two-camp international class war theory, any union of capitalist powers was for the purpose of aggression against the Soviet republics, Communist policy should, through diplomacy, try to encourage the contradictions and prevent the

formation of a hostile grouping of capitalist states.

2. If these efforts failed the Communists should try to discredit and disintegrate the capitalist alliance by propaganda through the Communist International, by front organizations and every other available means. This propaganda was intended to show that the capitalist alliance was aimed at aggression and war and was contrary to the peaceful intentions proclaimed by the governments concerned or by such international organizations as the League of Nations and later the United Nations.

3. In case this policy failed or made slow progress, the Communists resorted to the old political maxim, "If you can't beat 'em join 'em." If the capitalists refused to admit Soviet Russia to the group, it would be proof that the capitalist aims were not peace but war. If the Communists were admitted, they would find themselves in disagreement with the other members of the group, who might then be either exposed as imperialist aggressors or be frustrated, disrupted and perhaps broken up.

4. In case the capitalist group survived these tactics, the Communists would create a counter-balancing force or group which would, of course, be led by the Communists but into which other countries with different political and social systems would be welcomed if they were really peace-loving or if they feared aggression or domination by the coalition of their fellow members of the capitalist camp.

The model for this counter-balancing group was set up when the Communist parties of the several Soviet republics signed treaties creating the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1922-1923, which, as Stalin described it, was based on a foundation of "peaceful coexistence and fraternal cooperation" and which, he hoped, would be "both a true bulwark against international capitalism and a decisive step toward unifying all the toilers of the world into a World Soviet Socialist Republic."

The League of Nations

The first international grouping to which the Soviet government had not been invited and for which Communist leaders expressed

both fear and contempt was the League of Nations. They referred to it as the "so-called League of Nations" and alleged that "this quasi-international institution actually serves as a screen to conceal from the masses the predatory imperialist purposes of some Great Powers and their vassals." The Communists were not in a position to set up immediately a counter-balancing group but they laid the foundation upon which an anti-League bloc might be formed by denouncing the Treaty of Versailles and taking the side of the "revisionist" states which resented and hoped to revise the Versailles terms. The Communists made a special effort to win the friendly cooperation of the German government; they were temporarily successful in negotiating the treaty of Rapallo in 1922 under the noses of the League of Nations powers while the Genoa Conference was in session. To prevent Germany from becoming a member of a European bloc, of which the Soviet Union was not a member, was in the 1920's and still remains one of the chief aims of Soviet diplomacy.

In order to achieve this aim, the Communists opposed all measures undertaken by the League and the United States to revive the economic position of Germany and to improve relations between Germany and France and other recent enemies. In 1924, the Fifth Congress of the Communist International urged the German proletariat to oppose the Dawes Plan, get rid of the Social Democrats, seize their government, and join in setting up a European federation of workers and peasants in a United States of Europe, which would become the cornerstone of the world Socialist republic.

The national Communist parties and the Soviet government opposed the draft treaty of mutual assistance and the Geneva protocol drawn up under the auspices of the League in 1923 and 1924. In the following year the Communists made much greater but unsuccessful efforts to keep Germany from signing the Locarno treaties and joining the League. Rykov, then chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, said that the reason for Soviet opposition to Locarno was obvious. "If the capitalist states unite, if they try to iron out their conflicts, their strength will increase." Since the capitalists disapproved of the Soviet system,

one of them—he mentioned Britain as an example—might decide to attack the U.S.S.R. and make use of this newly acquired strength. The League, he said, was an instrument of war, not of peace, of oppression, not liberation and the Soviet Union would not join it because it would be a betrayal of the workers and of the oppressed colonial peoples. *Izvestia* in an editorial (September 24, 1925) called the League a coalition of victors—of vultures who "not only divided the spoils, but also formed an alliance to protect them."

In 1934, the Soviet government accepted an invitation to join this coalition of vultures, and, at a secret meeting, the League Council awarded a permanent seat on that body to the U.S.S.R.

When the Soviet delegation took its seat in the Assembly in September, 1934, Litvinov explained that the U.S.S.R. had decided to join the League in order to collaborate in developing its potentialities for safeguarding peace. Seven years before (April 19, 1927) Litvinov had described the League as "only an instrument in the hands of a small group of some of the biggest imperialist states for supremacy over the other states."

Professor I. F. Ivashin in an article entitled "The USSR's Struggle Against the Attempts to Form Anti-Soviet Blocs" (*International Affairs*, Moscow, September, 1957) describes the Locarno treaties as an imperialist plot against the U.S.S.R. and Poland, Czechoslovakia and the other nations of Eastern Europe, and he adds that the United States did not take part officially but was actually the backstage manager.

The Baltic states, worried by a Communist attempt to seize power in Estonia in December, 1924, began negotiations among themselves and with Poland for common defense and for what was called an "Eastern Locarno." When Poland proposed a treaty guaranteeing frontiers with Poland and the Baltic states on one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other, the Communists rejected these proposals as hostile to the U.S.S.R. and as a scheme to make Poland dominant in the Baltic.

The Communists were equally suspicious of and for a time opposed to the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument

of national policy. Chicherin wrote in *Izvestia*, August 5, 1928, that the Pact was a weapon for encircling, isolating and attacking the Soviet Union. Ivashin, 30 years later, says it was a plot to form an anti-Soviet coalition based on the theory that conflicts among the capitalists could be settled peacefully but conflicts with the Soviet Union could be settled only by war. Ivashin explains that the Soviet government foiled the plot by joining the Pact and doing everything possible to transform it into an instrument of peace.

Another plot which the Soviet Union foiled was Aristide Briand's suggestion, in September, 1929, that the League take up proposals to form a European Union. This project, Ivashin explains, was a French scheme to establish a united front of European capitalist countries for war against the U.S.S.R. under the slogan of "Pan-Europe." This war against the Soviet Union was intended as a means by which the capitalists could escape from the depression. The U.S.S.R. protested at not being invited to take part. The League Commission for Inquiry for European Union then invited the Soviet government to join the discussion. The Soviet government accepted the invitation with reservations and was able, according to Ivashin, to thwart the attempt to form an anti-Soviet Pan-European bloc.

During the 1930's the Communists faced another and more actively hostile bloc in the formation of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis which came into being in 1936 just as Stalin was beginning the Great Purges of the former leaders of the Communist party and of high ranking members of Soviet military and naval forces. The Soviet Union attempted to meet the open hostility of the Axis by the usual methods of propaganda and diplomacy and even by a tentative move to affiliate with or at least collaborate with the bloc established under the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis Pact of 1936 and the later Tripartite Pact of 1940.

This began with the August, 1939, treaties with Nazi Germany, collaboration with Germany in the partition of Poland by the secret agreement of September 28, 1939, the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of April 13, 1941, and in the negotiations in Berlin, November 12-13, 1940, regarding the "new

order" to be established after the anticipated defeat of the British Empire. The Soviet Union's demands for its share of the spoils were not modest, as the documents reveal. The efforts of the Communists to deal with the anti-Communist bloc ended decisively on June 22, 1941, when the Nazis began the invasion of the U.S.S.R. against which the Communists had so often warned their followers and the world at large.

Nato and the Cold War

The origins of Nato are examined elsewhere in this issue of *Current History*. I should like to remark here that, like so many other groupings against which the Communists inveighed, Nato was a response to a situation created by the Communists' efforts—military, diplomatic, propagandist, to "liberate" peoples in other countries from the yoke of capitalism and imperialism and the efforts—military, economic, diplomatic and propagandist, of the non-Communist countries to aid free countries to defend themselves against the yoke of communism and to exercise the right of self-determination in choosing the kind of political and social order under which they wished to live. The struggle which ensued we call the Cold War. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, Nato, Seato, the Baghdad Pact, carried out or initiated by the United States, and the Colombo Plan in which the United States took part were all measures to give economic, technical and military aid in order to improve conditions of instability and insecurity so that these conditions could not be exploited by Communist propaganda or by political and military pressure. This was the containment policy.

The Communists have represented these efforts by the United States and its allies as warlike manifestations of "contemporary decadent capitalism" with "United States imperialism as the bulwark and center of world reaction. . . ." The Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) resolved "that the basic source of military danger continues to be the aggressive course pursued by American imperialism reflecting the striving of U.S. capitalist monopolies for world domination." This striving, said the C.P.S.U., can only take the form of war but since war is dangerous, cold war

is resorted to as preparation for hot war. In accordance with the Communist theory of the two camps and the class struggle in the international arena—not much emphasized in recent years—the Communists reacted to the policies of containment as they had reacted to the collective security of the League of Nations and on other occasions in the past.

When the Marshall Plan was announced late in June, 1947, two of the Communist-ruled states, Czechoslovakia and Poland, responded favorably to the American invitation. But the C.P.S.U. condemned the Marshall Plan as an American scheme to escape the economic crisis the Communists said was coming by making profits instead of helping Europe. In the United Nations, M. N. Vyshinsky said the Plan was a variant of the Truman Doctrine, that it violated the principles of the U.N. and split Europe into two camps with a bloc hostile to the "democratic" countries of Eastern Europe. The Communists were not able to prevent, disintegrate or join the Marshall Plan. But they ordered the Czechoslovak and Polish Communists to withdraw from it; they also set up counter-balancing groups—the Communist Information Bureau (the Cominform) in 1947 and the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (Cema) in 1949.

The C.P.S.U. also viewed with disfavor an attempt from 1945 to January, 1948, by two experienced Communists, Tito and Dimitrov, and their lieutenants to establish a Balkan Union or Federation headed by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The promoters claimed that such an organization would solve many long-standing Balkan territorial problems, and it was implied that the federation might grow and create a state strong enough to resist pressure from Moscow. On January 28, 1948, *Pravda*, in three short paragraphs, told the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communists to mind their own internal affairs and stop concerning themselves with "problematical and artificial" projects in a South Slav federation. Stalin is said to have told Dimitrov that he was acting as if he were still secretary of the Comintern, dissolved in 1943.

After Nato had come into being in 1949 the Communists continued the propaganda along the lines set forth in the Soviet statement already referred to. At the Fifth Session

of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1950, a Soviet declaration urged that propaganda for a new war be prohibited, that nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction be banned, and that the U.N. ask the United States, Great Britain and France—the principal leaders of Nato—to unite with Communist China and the Soviet Union and conclude a Pact for the consolidation of peace.

The Warsaw Pact

As a counter-balancing force to Nato, and particularly in response to the Paris Agreements of 1954–1955 under which the German Federal Republic joined the Western European Union, the Communists organized a Warsaw Treaty Organization based on a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed on May 14, 1955. The Warsaw Pact was explained as having been made necessary by the refusal of the Western Europeans to make a European collective security agreement. The Warsaw Pact was open to other states regardless of their social and political systems and it was limited to European problems. Communist China did not sign but pledged its support. The Communists did not say that this Pact tightened, if any further tightening were needed, the C.P.S.U.'s control over the Communist parties that ruled the satellite states.

Almost continuously since the German Federal Republic was admitted to Nato, the Communists have kept up their attacks on Nato stressing particularly the danger of a new war started by the West Germans for revenge and the recovery of East Germany and the territories taken from Germany and annexed to the U.S.S.R., Poland and Czechoslovakia. The resolution signed by leaders of the twelve ruling Communist parties in 1957, at the time of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, denounced the Nato, Baghdad and Seato pacts and called for strengthening the Warsaw Pact. The Asian-African Solidarity Conference in December, 1957, at which the U.S.S.R. and Red China had strong delegations, was persuaded to denounce the Nato, Baghdad, Seato Pacts, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Colombo Plan, Euratom, the European Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market.

In 1958, the Soviet government issued a statement in *Pravda* (December 15) and in *Izvestia* (December 16) charging that the Nato Council devoted every session to producing as many means of annihilation as possible, that the danger of war would be increased by giving nuclear weapons to West Germany and that Nato was not really interested in increasing international trade but only in making Europe more dependent on the United States. The Soviet government then reverted to the joining tactic and proposed a treaty of non-aggression between the Nato and Warsaw Pact powers; a de-nuclearized zone in Central Europe, the commencement of a coordinated reduction of foreign troops in Nato and Warsaw Pact countries, the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons; and the transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city governing its own affairs.

At the time of the tenth anniversary of the founding of Nato the Communists repeated and elaborated the old propaganda theme that Nato was the greatest threat to peace

and was responsible for the arms race which was becoming more dangerous because the United States had agreed to turn over secret information about atomic weapons to West Germany, The Netherlands, Turkey and Canada as a preparation for a war in which these weapons would be used. Moreover Nato activities, the Communists claimed, actually undermined the national security of its members among whom, said the statement, there never was any real solidarity.

The attacks on Nato are not ended. Their intensity has been increased by fear of a prosperous and powerful West Germany on good terms with the old enemy, France, no longer isolated but playing a more and more important role as a member of the Nato alliance. This is further evidence that the Communists have not yet solved the problem of how to wage the international class struggle without causing those they wish to divide and defeat to unite in a common defense; and that the capitalists are solving those contradictions that the Communists believed would prevent unity and cooperation.

"In order that the principles of peaceful coexistence should become completely established in relations between the States, it is necessary, in our opinion, to put an end to the cold war. The peoples cannot permit the unnatural state of the cold war to continue any longer, just as they could not permit epidemics of the plague or of cholera to rage unchecked.

"What does ending the cold war mean, and what must be done to accomplish this? First of all, it is necessary to put an end to appeals or calls for war. There is no hiding the fact that belligerent speeches continue to be made by certain nearsighted statesmen. Is it not time to put an end to the brandishing of arms and threats addressed to other States?

"The cold war is doubly dangerous because it is going on in conditions of an unbridled armaments race which, like an avalanche, is increasing suspicion and distrust among States. Nor must it be forgotten that the cold war began and is proceeding at a time when the aftermath of World War II has not yet been eliminated, when a peace treaty with Germany has not yet been concluded, and when an occupation regime is still maintained in the heart of Germany, in Berlin, on the territory of its Western sectors. Eliminating this source of tension in the centre of Europe, in the potentially most dangerous area of the world where major armed forces of the opposing military alignments are close to each other, would furnish the key to improving the entire international climate. We appeal to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France to make every effort to reach agreement on real steps toward achieving this goal.

"* * * I would like to say that the United Nations will fulfil its noble mission far more successfully if it succeeds in removing the elements of the cold war which often handicap its activities. . . ."

—Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R., in an address delivered before the U.N. General Assembly, September 18, 1959.

"The single greatest obstacle to Atlantic unity and democracy is the emphasis on self-centered nationalism and imperial gloire." This analysis of the West European view of Nato focuses on the need for "moral authority" to frustrate Communist plans, and warns of "the weakening of democracy on the European continent." In this view "the European Economic Community . . . has become in the eyes of certain circles not primarily a step to enhance the welfare and prosperity of the people . . . but a replica of the continental empires of Charlemagne or of Napoleon."

Western Europe and Atlantic Unity

By HANS KOHN

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COOPERATION between Western Europe and North America, the nations bordering on the North Atlantic, has in the last ten years changed the situation in Europe. At the end of World War II Western Europe was economically devastated and politically helpless. Communist parties exercised a great influence within the governments of France and Italy. The danger that communism might spread to the Atlantic haunted many minds. The French government, under General De Gaulle and with Georges Bidault as foreign minister, claimed France as a "bridge" or mediator between the English-speaking nations on the one hand and Eastern Europe on the other hand. In his speech before the United Nations on September 20, 1947, Bidault deplored the division of Europe into "two hostile camps" and regarded France as a third force between the two contending imperial blocs. In the fall of 1947 I heard the same said by many Czechs

on the occasion of my last visit to Czechoslovakia.

The situation changed radically the following February when the Communists' coup established their exclusive control over Czechoslovakia, an event which in its consequences can be compared to Hitler's march into Prague in March, 1939. As a result, in May, 1948, France, Britain and the Benelux countries established a Western European military alliance. The following month the Soviet authorities closed all the avenues of land traffic leading to West Berlin. This blockade ended only after a successful air lift which lasted for more than ten months, in May, 1949, on the condition that a four-power conference be called to discuss the problems of Germany and West Berlin.

It was under these conditions that in 1949 two steps were taken, which were intended to prevent a further weakening of the Western European position. The Council of Europe was created, with its seat in Strasbourg, France, and in Washington, D.C., the treaty was signed which established Nato or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These steps marked the end of the hope which, after World War II, the democratic nations of the West entertained for cooperation with the Soviet Union in continuation of their wartime partnership. It was a mistake of Western leadership, especially of United States foreign policy under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, that no alternative policy was prepared in case the Soviet leadership should refuse cooperation. In fact, any pro-

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found knowledge of Communist ideology or even of powerful trends in Russian history should have convinced American leadership of the need for being prepared. An American war correspondent wrote before the establishment of Nato that

the nature of the alternative course of action was clear enough, and it was one of those happy alternatives which could have been prepared without endangering the success of the primary policy. It was, in effect, to create under American leadership a kind of peace federation of like-minded nations whose material strength and moral authority were so great that no one nation would long have dared to run counter to their will.¹

The main emphasis in these words seems to lie with "moral authority." Though material strength was needed to deter totalitarianism, Fascist or Communist, from attacking the democracies, a new and decisive factor in world history emerged after 1948, the rise to sovereignty of the old and new nations of Asia and Africa and the end of all the European colonial empires. From the time of Lenin on, Soviet Russia had hoped to utilize the movement for emancipation and equality among Chinese and Indians, Arabs and Africans, for the benefit of communism in its struggle against the West. In that connection "moral authority" much more than material strength is the weapon which will frustrate, and to a large extent has already frustrated, Communist hopes.

Walter Kolarz, one of the leading experts on "communism and nationalism," pointed out recently how strongly the actions of the West, endowing it with moral authority, may influence the fate of communism and its relationship with its subject peoples:

The progressive liquidation of Western colonialism in Asia and Africa is also bound to have its bearing on the situation in the Soviet Empire. The more colonial countries acquire independence, the more does the situation in Russia become outdated, and the greater will be the moral, and ultimately even the physical pressure for a change in the status of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. It has often been said that every injustice committed in the West strengthens communism in the East and in the world as a whole. This is undoubtedly correct. But it is equally true that every wrong righted in the West, and every racial conflict successfully solved, must likewise affect the future of

communist domination. It must bring nearer both the doom of communism and the emancipation of the peoples living under Soviet rule.²

Weakening Democracy

The Council of Europe has achieved very little in the first decade of its existence. It has in no way justified the great hopes aroused by Winston Churchill in his addresses in 1946 at the University of Zurich and in 1948 at the European Congress in The Hague.³ On the other hand Nato has shown itself on the whole a success. It has established a well functioning organization and it has kept Western Europe not only free from Soviet aggression, but in several ways has diminished the Soviet threat to the West. Nevertheless, seen from Western Europe, Nato faces today a serious test, not of its material strength but of its moral authority. The crisis is based upon the growth of nationalism, on the one hand, and the weakening of democracy, on the other hand, in Western Europe, especially among the three larger continental nations, France, Germany and Italy. It is only among the British and among the smaller nations on the continent of Europe that democracy seems well-established and grows best.

The weakening of democracy on the European continent—a weakening not in favor of communism but of a self-centered old-fashioned nationalism—has also weakened the tenuous bonds of closer cooperation and integration among the democratic European nations and of the Atlantic community. In his famous address before the *École Militaire*, General De Gaulle declared (and in view of the splendor and incisiveness of his style it might be worthwhile to quote verbatim):

Le système qu'on a appelé intégration qui a été inauguré et même, dans une certaine mesure, pratiqué après les épreuves que nous avons traversées, alors qu'on pouvait croire que le monde libre était placé devant une menace imminente et illimitée, et que nous n'avions pas encore re-

¹ Wallace Carroll, *Persuade or Perish* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948) p. 373. Such a course of action was proposed by Clarence Streit, even before World War II, against the danger of fascist totalitarianism.

² *The Absent Countries of Europe*, lectures held at the Collège de l'Europe Libre, Berne, Ost-Europa-Bibliothek, 1958, p. 104.

³ See Hans Kohn, "The Difficult Road to Western Unity," *Orbis, A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs*, Fall, 1959, pp. 297-312.

couvré notre personnalité nationale, le système de l'intégration a vécu. . . . Il faut évidemment que nous sachions nous pourvoir au cours des prochaines années d'une force capable d'agir pour notre compte, de ce qu'on est convenu d'appeler force de frappe, susceptible de se déployer à tout moment et n'importe où. Il va de soi qu'à la base de cette force sera une arme-ment atomique . . . qui doit nous appartenir; et puisqu'on peut détruire la France, éventuellement, à partir de n'importe quel point du monde, il faut que notre force soit faite pour agir où que ce soit sur la terre. Vous vous rendez compte comme moi de l'envergure de cette obligation . . . Il faut avoir le courage de la vouloir et celui de la remplir. Dans le do-main de la défense, ce sera notre grande œuvre pendant les années qui viennent.⁴

Democracy has been fundamentally weakened in France by the events of May, 1958, when an uprising of the French army put an end to the Fourth Republic and brought General De Gaulle to power. Though his government formally adheres to the various programs of European and Atlantic coopera-tion, the right spirit, the "moral authority," is absent. At a press conference held in Paris on April 7, 1954, General De Gaulle declared that it was the mission of France, without ceasing to be a member of the Atlantic alliance, to organize Europe along lines which did not prevent possible coexistence between Moscow and Washington. "Above all, let us remain French, sovereign, independent, and free."

Premier Michel Debré warned in a speech on August 15, 1959, against "bondage" to a "foreign power," and the foreign power was not primarily the Soviet Union. In the third volume of his magnificent *Mémoires de Guerre*, General de Gaulle glorifies the strong state, the strong leader and the unique mission of French civilization. His acknow-ledged ambition is to make of France, which he prefers to call Gaul, "one of the three world powers and should it be necessary one day, the arbitrator between the two camps, the camps of the Soviets and that of the Anglo Saxons.⁵

To that end of making France the third world power through leadership in Europe, the European Economic Community of the six nations (France, Germany, Italy, Bel-gium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) has

become in the eyes of certain circles not primarily a practical step to enhance the wel-fare and the prosperity of the people through enlarged trade but a replica of the continental empires of Charlemagne or of Na-poleon. Under the leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and of Professor Walter Hallstein, formerly Secretary of State in the foreign office at Bonn and since 1958 Presi-dent of the European Economic Community, the German Federal Republic has fully sup-ported de Gaulle. It has been one of the great European achievements of the past decade that Adenauer has put an end to the long hostility between France and Germany, a hostility which goes back to the division of Charlemagne's empire and which was intensi-fied in the nineteenth century. But against the advice of Ludwig Erhard, Bonn's very successful minister of economic affairs, Bonn's policy has become so exclusively ori-ented toward Paris that it has created the impression of being fundamentally anti-British.

Weakening German Democracy

This is deeply regrettable. On the one hand such a policy widens the growing rift in Europe. On the other hand it weakens German democracy. Democracy in Ger-many is a very recent and very tenuous growth. It cannot find much encouragement in a close cooperation with the French Fifth Republic or with Franco Spain. It would find greater strength in cooperation with Britain and with the Scandinavian states, which are stable democracies, and which have proven themselves throughout the most

⁴ "The policy termed integration, that was inaugurated and to a certain extent, even practiced after the trials we endured when it was believed that an imminent and unlimited menace was hanging over the free world and we had not yet recovered our national personality, has lived. . . . It is obvious that we must learn how to create in the years to come a power capable of acting in our behalf, that is, a striking force, that can be used anytime and anywhere necessary. It goes without saying that the basis of such power would be an atomic armament which would belong to us; since France can eventually be de-stroyed from any point in the world, our power must be such that it can strike anywhere on this earth. You realize as I do the scope of this obligation. . . . One must have the courage to will it and to fulfill it. In the domain of our defense, this will be the great work of the years ahead."

⁵ Charles de Gaulle, *Le Salut*, Paris: Plon, 1959, p. 179. On the occasion of his visit to Stalin, de Gaulle declared, "that there exist no objects of direct conflict (*contestation*) between France and Russia. Such conflicts we have had with Great Britain and we still have them." Pp. 68f, 37f. On democracy in France see Raymond Aron, "La démocratie a-t-elle un avenir en France?" in the monthly *Prévues*, Paris, July 1959. Ray Alan writes in *Commentary*, January 1960, that the RTF (Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française) has become so national-istic in its commentaries that nothing similar has been heard in Western Europe, outside Spain, since 1945.

trying periods of the nineteenth and the twentieth century during which France, Germany and Italy fell victim to nationalist intoxication and various forms of antidemocratic dictatorship. There has been lately an ominous rise of nationalism in Germany, too, accompanied unfortunately by some official attempts at whitewash under the pretext that an honest facing of the facts might play into the hands of communism. In fact, however, only a thorough housecleaning will really prevent the growth of fascist or Communist influences in countries where democracy is not firmly rooted.⁶

The rift in Europe between the Franco-German led European Economic Community and the recently formed European Free Trade Association under British leadership, to which the three Scandinavian nations, Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal adhere, is growing. This rift weakens the cohesion of Western Europe, weakens democracy, and thereby weakens the Atlantic community. The E.F.T.A. was formed as a protective alliance of the countries affected by the discriminatory measures of the E.E.C., but it has always been regarded by them as a possible bridge toward the E.E.C. with the principal and ultimate aim of overcoming the present conflict in European integration.⁷

Undoubtedly Great Britain committed a serious error by not assuming the leadership toward European integration in the early 1950's, when such leadership might have assured the emergence of a truly democratic Western Europe. Today Britain is afraid of any close political ties with countries which as recently as 1940, and partly even today, have given ample proof of their fundamental lack of democratic spirit and the instability of their democratic institutions. These countries, especially France, are countries in which the spirit of a rigid centralism prevails, and where little understanding exists for the pluralism and the variety of local self-government and of federalism, on which alone a democratic European and Atlantic community can be built.

The Communist bloc is also torn by conflicting national state interests and traditions. But there the commitment to a common ideology, to a common interpretation of history, a common image of man's place

in society and of the power of the state, tends to overcome conflicting national interests.

The Atlantic community can show enduring strength only if it is not regarded purely as a defensive measure against Soviet aggression, overlooking other dangers of totalitarianism which have been deeply rooted in the recent past of continental Europe. The Atlantic community must, in order to overcome the deeply rooted nationalistic antagonisms and traditions of its members, also have a commitment to a common idea; it must be a group of like-minded nations who put their emphasis on the moral ideas of human dignity, equality and liberty everywhere. These ideas should carry a message spreading behind the iron curtain, but the message can spread there only if it is fully applied where it can be applied by the West itself, namely in the nations and the dependencies of the Atlantic community.

Spain and the Atlantic Community

One of the symptoms of the uneasiness prevailing among the nations of the Atlantic community is the discussion about the invitation to Spain to join in the guardianship of democracy and human freedom. It is still well remembered by whose support and under what conditions the present government of Spain came to power. A haughty rejection of, and an utter contempt for, the democratic way of life has been voiced repeatedly by the spokesmen of the present Spanish regime.

The rise to power of General de Gaulle in France and recent actions by the governments of the United States and by the German Federal Republic have been regarded by the present Spanish regime as a justification of its anti-democratic course. The fact that the Spanish government can entertain such a view is in itself proof of the decline of democracy and moral strength in the Atlantic community. One of the distinguished United States experts on Spain, Arthur P. Whitaker, has recently emphasized in a report on "anti-Americanism in Spain" that

⁶ See the article by Rudolf Pechel, a German conservative resistance fighter against national socialism and a staunch anti-Communist, "Überhöhte Warnungen" in the March, 1960, issue of the excellent German monthly, *Deutsche Rundschau*.

⁷ See Willy Bretscher, editor in chief, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, "Switzerland and European Integration," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, Zurich, April, 1960.

"virtually all the opponents of the present regime, who probably constitute a large majority of the population and who represent a wide diversity of political groups and all classes of society" complain that by virtue of the bases agreement the United States has become "the ally and chief prop of the regime, without which the latter could not have maintained itself."⁸

The breakdown of the Summit Conference in May, 1960, may for a time outwardly solidify the Atlantic community. But this unity is only an outward appearance which depends on the temporary and temperamental truculence of Khrushchev. Only nations that are committed to a common ideal of representative democracy and of individual liberty can be truly united. Unity and democracy are closely interwoven in the Atlantic community. This interconnection constitutes the distinctive character of that community, as compared with other power blocs. The single greatest obstacle to Atlantic unity

and democracy is the emphasis on self-centered nationalism and imperial *gloire*. Such an emphasis is an anachronism which could lead the nations involved into great political and, above all, moral calamity. The German historian, Ludwig Dehio, pointed to this danger as early as 1953:

Today liberty—that is the liberty of the individual, not of the state—can only be preserved as the common property of a consolidated group of nations, and any nation which draws aside to save its own [power position] will lose it. . . . It is extremely difficult for some free European nations in their changed surroundings to master the anachronistic instincts that they have formed during the centuries of the European system, and the task is hardest of all for the two great neighbors, Germany and France, in whom the continental mentality has crystallized in its most typical form.⁹

⁸ *Orbis, a Quarterly Journal of World Affairs*, Philadelphia, Vol. III, No. 3, p. 320. See also C. L. Sulzberger's column "Foreign Affairs" in *The New York Times*, February 9, 1959.

⁹ Ludwig Dehio, *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959) p. 138.

"... Europe is on the move. This was already true in the recent past and is even truer today. Industrialists and business men have put their money on the Community; they are thinking and acting in relation to the new realities. Rationalization measures, investment schemes, agreements between enterprises and establishment of trade organizations on the Community level are so many overlapping signs of a broader outlook. Europeans in leading positions believe that a big market must come, and they are earnestly preparing for it.

"This is a fact of capital importance. It may be true that at one time the statesmen's Europe was in advance of the Europe of the managers and business men—and who could fail to understand the legitimate caution of the latter . . .? The appeal made . . . in May 1950 has reached the ears of . . . our peoples, and European integration has entered the domain of realities. Not only is economic Europe (if you will forgive this elliptical expression) putting its trust in the Europe of the statesmen, but it has begun to act, and its actions commit the whole future of the enterprises concerned. This choice means that a return to the past is unthinkable, that the process set in motion by the Treaty of Rome is irreversible, and that the political will to establish the European Community has produced, in a very short space of time, considerable changes in the apparatus of production.

"No one . . . questions the unity of our native countries and each is legitimately attached to the happiness and wealth of his own. Each of our countries, however, attained a relatively high degree of prosperity only by becoming united. Where would we be if Western Europe were no more than a collection of provinces or regions? And what would become of us if tomorrow we failed to agree to join a vaster grouping of a novel type, in which the new acquisitions are enjoyed in common without disturbing the national heritage of each participant? Let us be frank: the establishment of the European Economic Community is a political fact. Those responsible for the organization of this Community have at all times affirmed . . . their intention to further the political unity of Europe."

—Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission, European Economic Community, in an address delivered November 10, 1959.

Because "the central mechanics of world politics remain those of the balance of power, as much as we would prefer to wish them away," and because "Nato is one of the central elements of the balance . . .," this author believes that Nato's "chief contribution to the United Nations has been, and will probably remain, its function as a stabilizing element in international relations."

Nato and the United Nations

By Ross N. BERKES

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LOOKING back upon the 40-year history of international organization, it becomes apparent that the paramount rationale for the League and the United Nations was the construction of a new system of international security. Neither effort has been successful, although fortunately failure has not been so disastrous for the United Nations as it was for the League. Perhaps we have finally reached the point where the concept of a world organization can be appreciated apart from its contribution—or lack of contribution—to international security. If so, this is progress, for the world is no more ready for a universal security system than it is for an effective system of world law. It does little service to the idea of international organization to measure either its worth or its potential in terms of the coercive machinery it has been able to construct or invoke.

What has been written above constitutes a minimization—almost a dismissal—of the

United Nations as a security organization, coupled with an appeal to judge its merits in terms of other criteria, all of this despite the historical fact that the United Nations, no less than the League before it, was built and presented to the world primarily as a security organization. Both organizations have stood for the replacement of a balance of power system of security, and on grounds that it was lacking in both morality and success. The alternative proposed under both has been identified as "collective security," a phrase that has been so badly abused during the past generation that it has come to mean almost any security arrangement between two or more powers, whether balance of power or otherwise.

Indeed, the tendency to identify any multilateral security system as a system of collective security, however logical, contributes only to intellectual chaos, in that it helps mainly to defeat any effort at distinguishing a security system that is the creature of balance of power politics and one that is not. The system proposed under both the League and the United Nations, and which, for better or worse, has been called "collective security," was and remains consciously posed as an alternative to a balance of power-cum-alliance system of security. The casual identification of phenomena of the latter under the same heading as the former may lead one to wonder where education in international relations really begins. Certainly, a useful understanding of either Nato or the United Nations, let alone the relationship between the two, can hardly rest on such confusion.

As a security system, collective security

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operates on the principle of a stable and continuous preponderance of power, one to be invoked not arbitrarily, but predictably, and one ideally geared to ethical and legal norms of operation. It visualizes automatic collective action by the community of states on its own behalf—a self-invited risk of injury to the participating states even though they are not themselves injured parties.

Collective Security

The cornerstone of a collective security system is community (international) interest, not national interest, for it involves the extension of a sense of social responsibility across the frontiers of the state. A universal system of collective security, such as the League or the United Nations hoped to achieve, projected that extension, by definition of their universality, to the world as a whole. The ethical element of collective security rests in the identification of wrong, for the security machinery invoked on behalf of the community is counterpoised against a wrongdoer. Since such a system posits the primacy of the community, it presumes the existence of a community, and—in the wake of the latter—something of a moral consensus as to both values and rules. It is, in short, the kind of security system operating inside a state on behalf of, and within the framework of, law.

In League days, the somewhat mechanistic element of predictability centered on the problem of defining aggression, or, if you will, the identification of those acts or that behavior of sufficient gravity and culpability to invoke systematic collective security. Aggression was never satisfactorily defined, although the game is still being pursued—somewhat more laconically—in the United Nations. Nor is it ever likely to be resolved until the realities of international relations permit “what” to replace “who” as the ultimate criterion of collective action. As Walter Lippmann wisely noted nearly a decade ago:

It has long seemed to me . . . that no universal society like the United Nations can survive if it is expected to execute the principle of collective security.

One need only add that a world divided into hostile power blocs, each capable of mammoth destruction in war, is precisely the

kind of world least able to afford a system of collective security.

The League vs. the U.N.

It can be argued that, as an international organization model, the United Nations in some ways is inferior to the League. Its function as a security organization, however, was portrayed in far more realistic terms. Perhaps it can be said that those who conceived the United Nations learned the lesson provided by the League's history: that systematic collective security was an illusion without Great Power unanimity. A quick review of the Charter, and of the voting procedure of the Security Council and its ubiquitous veto, make it clear that whatever the security machinery installed or to be constructed in the United Nations, it was not intended that it was to be invoked against a Great Power. Indeed, there is more realism than irony in the observation that while the United Nations projected a far more potent collective security system than did the League, it also projected a far less pretentious field in which it would—or could—operate. For as Professor Clyde Eagleton wrote some years ago, it was decided at the San Francisco Conference that “the United Nations . . . should not, except as a stated legal principle, include among its ambitions that of preventing the use of force by a Great Power.”

The partial shift of the security function from the Security Council to the General Assembly, symbolized by the Uniting for Peace Resolution passed by the latter body in 1950, has done little to enhance the prospects of using or adding to the machinery for collective security. The history of one of the organs born of the Resolution, the Collective Measures Committee, provides its own best evidence that the failure to develop collective security in the United Nations is not solely—or even mainly—chargeable to the Soviet veto in the Security Council. For that matter, it might well be argued that one of the less anticipated outcomes of this historic resolution of the General Assembly has been to provide a bridge between the security responsibilities of the United Nations and some of the security machinery outside of the United Nations.

The failure of the United Nations to develop an international police force, standing

or otherwise, and the sanguine reluctance even to consider such a concept as invokable against a Great Power (except possibly within the framework of an executed plan of general, controlled, and even complete national disarmament, whenever that unbelievable day arrives)—it is such observations as these that have led to great disappointment among many U.N. enthusiasts, particularly those schooled in the belief that international security was a first charge of the League's successor. Even the Korean War, which has already entered history books as the world's first successful experience in collective security, achieved that somewhat misleading distinction by means of rather artificial grafting and an awesome list of remarkable coincidences. Indeed, there is very little in the Korean example that a collective security model would reasonably emulate. Some would argue, and not without cause, that among the most burdensome parts of the Korean War response were precisely those features connecting it to collective security.

It is at least logical that those who were disappointed over the failure of the United Nations to initiate an effective collective security system, or even a minimal one, tended to be disconcerted over the rebirth of the alliance system. The launching of Nato, in itself a revolutionary departure for American foreign policy, was not without its critics, many of whom regarded it as little more than a modern version of a degenerate balance of power. The ominous parallelism between developments after 1919 and after 1945 did not pass unnoticed, for as one distinguished critic wrote:

Now, as then, but for different reasons, the over-all organization has failed to develop the strength and prestige which its makers had anticipated. Now, as then, and for the same reasons, member states have turned to more limited international security associations to supplement their own national strength. As before, those who enter into such associations proclaim that these new arrangements are supplementary, and in no way antagonistic, to the broader United Nations obligations.

A Rip Van Winkle of the early '20's might now rub his eyes, remark, "This is where I came in," and reach for his trusty flagon.

Quite clearly, Nato emerged as a military alliance, and in response to the threat of So-

viet aggression in Western Europe. It meant more than merely a coalition of military strength or potential, since it meant also the commitment of American power to the defense of Western Europe. In sharp contrast to France's difficulties in the interwar period, however, this new alliance was developed as a phenomenon compatible with the security machinery of the United Nations, and even subordinate to it. The ingenuity of reconciliation between Nato and the United Nations was reflected in Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provided that:

This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Nato to Fill U.N. Gap

In effect, the purpose of Nato was to fill one of the more glaring gaps in the security responsibilities and machinery of the United Nations: collective defense against a Great Power. Insofar as collective security could operate through the United Nations, Nato would play only a subordinate and nonrival role. But since the United Nations could not and did not intend to provide collective security machinery to be used against a Great Power, the burden of security against Great Power aggression—such as that menacing Europe from the Soviet Union—could only be provided by arrangements made outside the United Nations.

It seems strange, looking back upon the origins of Nato, that of those who were at least willing to concede the existence of a Soviet military threat, many remained unable or unwilling to understand that no effective response to such a threat could emanate from the United Nations—or even from the concept of collective security in general. It is also puzzling, for the Charter of the United Nations made clear what the Covenant of the League failed to clarify: the inapplicability of collective security against a Great Power.

Article 51 of the Charter

The harmonization of Nato and the United Nations was most effectively achieved

through what might best be described as the rediscovery of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and particularly the first sentence of that article, which stipulates that:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

It was largely Senator Vandenberg, instrumental in the adoption of Article 51 in 1945, while under one conception of its utility, who, in 1947, envisaged its significance for the possible emergence of Nato, if under a somewhat different conception. But whatever the conception, it was Senator Vandenberg's staunch view during the year prior to the birth of Nato, in 1949, that Article 51 was "the key provision, so far as effective hope for organized peace is concerned." Indeed, here was the device to "unlock the Charter," and to reorganize the United Nations "inside the Charter and outside the veto."

The Vandenberg slogans, conjuring as they may the irrelevant images of cigarette ads and Methodist hymnals, played no part in the reaction of Hans Kelsen, whose sense of irony seems to have stimulated the observation that the right of individual and collective self-defense as acknowledged through Article 51 "may play a greater role than it might be expected to play within an organization whose main purpose is to make the exercise of this right superfluous." Article 51 and the gap-filling role of Nato led the reconcilers to the further hope that an institutional link between Nato and the United Nations might emerge. Both the Collective Measures Committee and the General Assembly, early in the 1950's, urged a mutually-supporting relationship between the activities of such Article 51 phenomena as Nato and "collective measures undertaken by the United Nations."

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, carrying the same theme, advised the General Assembly late in 1952 that "regional and collective self-defense arrangements, entered into and developed in accordance with the Charter, are an integral part of a universal collective security system." But as far as

these two quotations are concerned, it might better be remarked, in all due respect, that the latter could be true and meaningful only to the extent that the former were realized, and that despite the optimism of the early 1950's, the former has made no perceptible progress toward realization. Nor is it likely to do so, for there is an inherent zone of incompatibility between an alliance system and a collective security system—one which no amount of verbal glossing can ever fully conceal.

Incompatibility

The incompatibility which is indicated here is, of course, not complete. It should even be said, or rather, reemphasized, that there is a great deal of compatibility—even more, as will be seen—between Nato and the United Nations. But to emphasize the latter at the expense of overlooking the former would be folly, for it must be added that the very conditions which have made Nato a necessity must continue to keep Nato independent of collective security and/or of any general peace enforcement commitments emanating from the United Nations. At the very least, what Nato powers will regard as essential to their security *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union must precede whatever role they might be expected to play, severally or collectively, on behalf of the United Nations.

There remains an ultimate logic as a sequel to this discussion, and that is to question, however reluctantly, the extent to which the United Nations should accept the burden of peace enforcement at all. One certainly has a right to query whether the machinery of sanctions—geared, as we have seen, to ethical and legal standards of right versus wrong—belongs in a society which out of prudence excepts Great Powers from its jurisdiction, and which can apply sanctions to lesser powers only at the risk of invoking the antagonism of one or more of the Great Powers. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, has been among the more perceptive critics of the persisting tendency to claim that the U.N. is, as he put it, "a world authority enforcing the law upon the nations."

Surely the great and vital contributions to be made by the United Nations in the care-

ful, responsible construction of a new order in world affairs can and must be made in fields other than that of collective security. To lend its moral support to other prime movers in this area may well have some virtue, but to assume its own primary responsibility and initiative could very well be disastrous.

Nato's Contribution to the U.N.

One returns, finally, to Nato, and perhaps to the realization that its chief contribution to the United Nations has been, and will probably remain, its function as a stabilizing element in international relations. The central mechanics of world politics remain those of the balance of power, as much as we would prefer to wish them away. Nato is one of the central elements of the balance, helping to preserve that stability which is essential for the future of the United Nations.

"In short, we are irreversibly part of a world-wide human community. But it is not a community that enjoys the structure of the safeguards of a civilized society. At home we live under law. We play our part in promoting the general welfare. We share some sense of national purpose. These are surely the minimum conditions of a truly civic life. . . .

"But all are lacking in our international world. Should not, therefore, the introduction of such fundamental institutions be the first aim of our world policy? * * *

"The main aims of our foreign policies by-pass this central issue. We do not pursue the general welfare. We pursue our separate national interests and hope that the selfish good of the part will add up—against the witness of all social history—to the wider good of the whole.

"We do not urgently seek a world under law. Primarily we seek national security or, in simpler terms, to stop the Russians. * * *

"The only basis for negotiation is certainly to match strength for strength, concession for concession, and never to suggest for a moment that the Russians can have something for nothing in the field of security. Nobody has improved on Churchill's definition of our posture at the bargaining table. 'We arm to parley.' Heaven help us if we don't.

"But equally, we aim to parley; . . . it is the only way to peace. . . . * * *

"Light could come, I believe, from working together on projects really relevant to our profoundest human needs. * * * Why not propose to the Russians an international commission to tackle the problem of the world's greatest deserts? We are on the verge of achieving the desalinization of water on an economic scale. Why not work out the implications of the scientific break-through in some great arid area and do it jointly . . . ?

"Why not speed our preparations for a world-wide medical year, and after it, set up permanent commissions in vital fields of research to formalize the fact that in this of all fields all knowledge should be available to all men!"

—Adlai E. Stevenson, former Governor of Illinois and presidential candidate for the Democratic party, 1952 and 1956, in an address delivered on May 12, 1960.

It would do no service to Nato, to world stability, or to the United Nations for Nato to diffuse the focus of its commitment or to relate itself more directly to the business of the United Nations.

The emerging task of Nato, besides that of building its defensive strength, is one of creating a community broader than one resting mainly on defensive alliance and common values. Nato is only the nucleus of a North Atlantic Community, and too little has been done to develop its wider potential. But, in any case, it would be wise to recall that basically Nato is an alliance for collective self-defense, an alliance born of the incapacity of the United Nations to provide a security system to protect the world against a Great Power. Its usefulness to the United Nations as a security organization is and must remain indirect. And yet, it is that very usefulness that may have preserved for the United Nations a future.

Pointing out that "Federation is an extremely rare form of government," this specialist raises the pointed query: "What mix of extreme poverty and affluence, republican institutions and dictatorships, Western science and primitive magic can possibly be housed under the great tent of one world constitution?" Terming the vision of world government a "panacea," he notes that "If 'peace' in the abstract were the only goal of man, then the unification of the world under the banner of the Soviet Union, the United States or Liechtenstein would make little difference." Because this is not the case, Gerard Mangone pleads instead for work on the "minutiae of international discussion, negotiation and agreement, through organizations that have slowly but surely been built from a fundamental consensus . . . the building blocks of a community."

The Fallacy of World Federalism

By GERARD J. MANGONE

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WHETHER reinforced by bad history or silly optimism the myth has persisted in America that wise men from thirteen separate and different states met in Philadelphia in 1787 and there discovered that federal union was the best way of safeguarding life, liberty, and the pursuit of property.

High-minded citizens, distraught by the anarchy of World War II, have been entranced by the idea of a Constitutional Convention in which all the nations of the world

would meet and establish a federal union, delegating some powers to a world government, but retaining local functions in the states. The peoples of Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas would be directly represented in a world congress while their states would meet in a house of nations; customs and international trade barriers would then fall; a common currency would follow; and world law would rule among peoples as national armies disarmed, yielding to a global peace-keeping police.

Unfortunately this image has been a panacea for many ills of international society that will require long, painstaking treatment with only a moderate hope of recovery. Any analogy between the Constitution of the United States and the creation of world government is false. It is a brave postulate of unreality destined to suffer a melancholy fate of disillusionment.

The thirteen British colonies along the Atlantic seaboard were not completely different "states" in the eighteenth century. They had a common sovereign and a common law, and their people had a common citizenship in the British Crown. The government at London was not only responsible for the defense of the colonies, but regulated interstate trade and a uniform currency. In eight colo-

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nies the Crown appointed directly the chief executives (governors) who, in turn, appointed the judges.

Richard Henry Lee had moved in his historical resolution before the Continental Congress on June 7, 1776, "that these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states." The Articles of Confederation then reflected the American revolt from a central British authority. For nine years, the United States lacked an independent national executive and a national judiciary. The central government was not permitted to levy and collect taxes directly nor was it allowed to borrow money, make treaties, or regulate the size of the army without the explicit consent of nine of the thirteen states. Under such circumstances Federalists, like John Jay, urged a stronger central government with these words:

Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of joint counsels, arms, and efforts. . . .

The federal union proposed by the Philadelphia Founding Fathers of 1787 re-delegated to the national American government powers that had been exercised by London for more than a century, but within the framework of a new republican state and the necessary political compromises of the day.

The final achievement of federal union, encompassing only five million people already united by geography, history, and mores, was still extraordinarily difficult. Only through shrewd political manipulation did the Federalists succeed in having the new Constitution ratified. A legislative quorum to call the ratifying convention in Pennsylvania was made by pinning three Antifederalists in their seats; Massachusetts ratified by the close margin of 187 to 168; a shift of 6 votes among the 168 Virginia delegates or a change of 2 votes at the New York convention would have scuttled the Federal Constitution in the pivotal states.

What has this to do with world government in the twentieth century for ninety sovereign nations, almost three billion people, scores of languages, and profoundly different value systems whether exemplified by Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, or Buddhism, or

liberal democracy and communism? What mix of extreme poverty and affluence, republican institutions and dictatorships, Western science and primitive magic can possibly be housed under the great tent of one world constitution?

Requirements for Federation

Federation is an extremely rare form of government. It requires neighboring peoples to have a shared history, common interests, and similar values. As long ago as 1835 Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out that Maine and Georgia, separated by a thousand miles in America, were closer in their "civilization" than Normandy and Brittany, separated only by a brook. A federal union almost certainly requires some previous experience with democratic government, for it emphasizes representation, majority votes and minority rights, the coordinate existence of two sets of laws, two sets of public officers, and a party system to give cohesion to a complex political organization.

To advocates of world government the evidence of unity among the nations on this globe rests upon the rapidity of communications, the interlocking of productive economic processes, and the possibility of total destruction through nuclear warfare. But such indices of "unity" ought not to blur the irrationality of man in his habits and his institutions. Since 1900 no fewer than 30 new sovereign states have been created from larger political bodies under the principle of national self-determination. And the number is growing as the European empires disband. Israel and Egypt geographically touch each other, use radio, the techniques of motion pictures, and newspapers alike, seek improved agriculture and industrial development with the same intensity, and have command of the same deadly instruments of war. But there is no "unity" between them. Can not the same be said of China and India, of Russia and the United States?

In plain fact the unity of the world or its several "regions" is very far from the rhetoric of most advocates of federation. The image of the world spanned by technical skills and economic processes must be matched by the spectre of the world divided by national sovereignties. If the union of peoples can be argued on the grounds of greater prosperity

and the end of local warfare, the self-determination of states can be argued on the more powerful grounds of freedom.

Any combination of states into a new polity, moreover, would require an agreement on how the power to make vital decisions would be shared. The United States Constitution, merely dealing with thirteen homogeneous American states, was a bundle of compromises tied with checks and balances, indirect suffrage, and a bill of rights. The question of ultimate sovereignty under that Constitution, namely, the right to secede from the Union, was only resolved by an atrocious Civil War in which a million men died or were wounded.

To give Latin America more votes than the United States, therefore, on the basis of population, would raise severe doubts about a regional federation; to give India more than twice as many votes as the United States or eight times as many votes as the United Kingdom in the decisions of a world government is politically incredible. And in a "senate" of equally represented states today the United States would be one in 80 or 90. Ingenious schemes have been devised to offset population as the sole determinant of decision-making power in regional or world federations, yet such plans seem to unlock new political tribulations rather than provide compromises. Just twelve years ago at a dinner of the World Republic convention the scientist Harold Urey suggested a system of weighted votes that would favor nations with high literacy and economic wealth. But Thomas Tchou, seated at the same table of men dedicated to world government, immediately objected that weighted representation was "immoral."

The central argument today for the rapid federation of states into a constitutional world government, however, rests upon the grisly threat of nuclear annihilation for millions, if not billions, of people should international war break out. But it is illogical to suppose that because many sensitive people recognize the horror that might be visited upon them by atomic warfare they will instantly surrender the material possessions and personal values that seem to give content and meaning to life itself.

If "peace" in the abstract were the only goal of man, then the unification of the world

under the banner of the Soviet Union, the United States, or Liechtenstein would make little difference. But peace, for virtually all of mankind, has never meant resignation to *any* political order, to *any* distribution of economic goods, to *any* hierarchy of values. On the contrary, it is assumed by all that peace would go hand in hand with a particular political order, a certain distribution of economic goods, and a fixed hierarchy of values. The hard rub comes from the day by day disagreements upon these essentials of human society.

History is clogged with illustrations of men who died for their faith, facing destruction just as inevitable in their day as the atomic bomb may be now. Although the wholesale destruction of the human race may be technically possible now, a fair examination of the records of the United States or the Soviet Union, China or France, will show what these governments (and their peoples) are *willing* to do about the threat of nuclear annihilation, not what they *ought* to do.

Evidence of the extreme caution of states in delegating power to international bodies is not lacking. The United Nations, for example, is nothing less than a universal treaty in which the contracting states have agreed that the organization may discuss, recommend, and even decide certain things under certain conditions. The Great Powers, however, were only willing to sign that treaty on condition that any one of them might veto any substantive action of the Security Council. In the General Assembly a two-thirds vote may carry on important matters, but the power of the Assembly is carefully limited to "recommendations." During the last 15 years, despite the cataclysmic potential of atomic warfare, there has been no evidence whatsoever that Ghana, Indonesia, or Yugoslavia, any more than the United States or the Soviet Union, are willing to put their vital interests, particularly their military defense, into the hands of an international, supranational, or world government.

The U.S. and the World Court

One of the best illustrations of the fear of people to delegate any power of decision to an international organization came from the United States itself in 1960. The United States, as a member of the United Nations,

is also a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Court can only decide cases which the states, both the plaintiff and the defendant, agree to refer to it. Thus, if the United States brought an international claim against the Soviet Union, but Russia did not agree to go before the Court, there is no action.

However, states may subscribe to a clause which automatically confers jurisdiction upon the Court without further special agreement in "legal" cases: namely, the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of a fact, which, if established, would constitute a breach of international obligation; and the nature or the extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. The Court, under this clause, can decide whether or not it has jurisdiction in such cases.

The United States, in subscribing to the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the International Court of Justice in 1946, not only excluded "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States," but also "*as determined by the United States*" (Connally amendment).¹ On the one hand, therefore, the United States offered to put a very narrow class of disputes under the jurisdiction of the Court without further agreement while, on the other hand, the United States reserved to herself the determination at any time on any one of these issues whether it is "domestic" and therefore excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court.

If this extremely narrow self-judging clause is representative of opinion in the United States on international legal issues, what reasonable expectation is there that the United States will yield as much or more of its sovereignty on political issues?

The President, the Vice-President, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice advocated the withdrawal of the Connally amendment, but failed in their efforts to bring it before the Senate in a cautious election year. Although the American Bar Association and virtually every distinguished scholar of international law supported the Administration's view of the juris-

diction of the Court, the tempest of American attack upon any change of this legal absurdity is a fact that cannot be disregarded by the proponents of grander conceptions of regional and world governments.

The State Bar of Texas in general assembly adopted by a large majority a resolution against withdrawal of the Connally amendment. One of the members of that bar, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, "I think we ought to get that vast nest of subversives out of New York City that are there on account of the United Nations." The American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, the National Association of Pro America, the Southern States Industrial Council, the Congress of Freedom of Omaha, Nebraska, and dozens of others all protested tampering with the Connally amendment. "As Christians," wrote a Pennsylvania churchman, "we fear for our safety and the continuance of our cherished liberties if we are ever placed under the jurisdiction of an alien, unfriendly, unsympathetic international court."

Leaving aside the marriages of absolute sovereigns and the irrelevant case of a re-United States of America, no great union of independent cantons, provinces, or states has ever taken place without coercion. Even tiny Switzerland, on the highest mountain tops and surrounded by powerful neighbors, was welded together by the arbitrary acts of Napoleon and the terms of the Peace Treaty of 1815, and it was not completely united until a Catholic cantonal rebellion had been subdued in 1847.

The Greek city-states with their kinship of religion and manners never achieved more than a "league" in the face of Persian might and they were finally overwhelmed and united by hard-fisted Macedonians. After hundreds of years of a common history and culture, Europe is *just beginning* to build the institutions that might be developed into a constitutional framework for regional government. The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Common Market are promising first steps toward regional government, but they are still confined to only six states. The Council of Europe, which is a broader political organi-

¹ For this text, see *Current History*, August, 1960, p. 115.

zation of the Continent, requires a unanimous vote of the representatives voting in the Committee of Ministers on most important matters—and specifically provides for withdrawal from the association. In truth, Napoleon and Hitler might have succeeded in unifying Europe more rapidly, bringing a dozen nations under one authority, one order, one philosophy of government, but the price was dictatorship.

Possibility of World Empire

The most likely avenue for the arrival of world government in the next century would not be federation, but imperial domination. Personal rule, led by force and maintained by an efficient bureaucracy, has had considerable success in holding aggregates of peoples together in "peace." Rome, the Ottoman Turks, Hapsburg Austria or the Muscovite Tsardom provide illustrations. *Pax Britannica* is an imperial term, not a federal one. Today the means may almost be available to some ruthless or messianic power to cower, subdue, and unify most of the earth on a platform of peace.

Federation and imperial conquest, however, are not the only alternatives open to the nations of the world, for states may continue to pursue their policies through alliances, balances of power, international agencies and organizations, international law, and the host of devices that add up to what William Rappard once called "international government by persuasion."

The most serious flaw in the argument for world government is the implication that government will create a community; exactly the reverse is true, for government is a reflection of the community, of the degree to which men share the same ideas, the same standards, the same values. The United States was not made into a democracy by its Constitution, but its Constitution was made democratic by the spirit of the people; and as the American society has become more democratic, its Constitution, originally a restricted document, has been interpreted more liberally whether the clause be general welfare, interstate commerce, or equal protection of the laws. The saddest example of constitution-making took place in Latin America in the nineteenth century. Having revolted from Spain, the leaders of the people

drafted constitutions for republics in the image of the United States, but without the "social tissue," to use Reinhold Niebuhr's phrase, to make a republic work. Between their independence and World War I the Spanish-American republics witnessed no fewer than 115 successful revolutions—and many more rebellions. A reading of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist States would leave an impression of a remarkably democratic state with federated nationalities, but no sense whatsoever of the role and function of the Communist party.

For those sincerely interested in preparing the people of the world for peaceful cooperation under one rule of law there is plenty of exciting work to do. A preoccupation for constitutions must yield to a concern for developing institutions. The history of international organization since the end of the nineteenth century offers considerable encouragement to the idea that states may find certain needs and interests best satisfied through an international instrumentality, whether it be a Universal Postal Union, an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or the United Nations itself. The problem for the individual is to evaluate these institutions as community-building operations and urge his nation, by that criterion, to agree to use the international agencies.

Action, Not Yearning

The organization of the world calls for action every day, not for idealistic yearning for the transformation of man and his society into some platonic ideal. Should the functions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization be widened? Can the United States contribute more to the United Nations Special Fund for economic development? How far ought Unesco to go in its draft convention on discrimination in education? What position ought the United States take in respect to a regional bank in Latin America? Whom should the United States support in the political debate of the Security Council? What about the Covenant on Human Rights? International health codes? Standards of safety for international aviation? Expanding the technical assistance program of the Food and Agriculture Organization? Or withdrawing

the Connally amendment to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice?

During the months of June and July, 1960, there were no fewer than 80 different public international councils, commissions, committees, or conferences in session. At the same time about 80 private international groups, in consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council, were holding their meetings on every subject from irrigation to Esperanto. These *minutiae* of international discussion, negotiation and agreement, through organizations that have slowly but surely been built from a fundamental consensus, provide the essence of preparing people for further institutional development toward a fundamental law—or a constitution.

No one pretends that these international arrangements are the sum of world government, but they can be the building blocks of a community. The over-arching system of the United Nations, moreover, is a training school for statesmen, technicians and administrators, regularly bringing them together to face common problems and habituating them to ways and means of cross-cultural operations. Over the course of a mere 15 years the Charter itself has been changed, not by constitutional revision, but by tacit amendments characteristic of the best political instruments.

Despite the noise about nuclear deterrents

and the genuine fear that grips every nation of the world, the peaceful work of international organization must go on. Errors and fumbles can be expected, but, as the Secretary General of the United Nations pointed out in his speech in Chicago in May, 1960, "Working at the edge of the development of human society is to work on the brink of the unknown."

World government, as a swoop from the present nation-state system to one unified political organization, whines for a negative, self-defeating doctrine. It falters in the face of the challenge of constructing healthy social tissue, day by day, for the international community. The patience of international government is needed to redress economic inequalities among the peoples of the world, to persuade states to channel their disputes through peaceful remedies, and to entwine sovereigns in a network of administration that will encourage—and ultimately require—cooperation among them. The poise of statesmen is most needed in the face of adversity; we need not a hysterical solution of imposing a dictatorial rule where there is no consensus, but the courage to keep trying to thread the strands of agreement together.

Portents of doom in this atomic age should underscore the urgency of strengthening community bonds through existing international institutions, and not propose to scuttle them. Modern man may be obsolete—but he's all we've got.

"It is clear, then, that the military obstacle to world peace is—and will continue to be—the armed might of the Sino-Soviet bloc. There is no other threat, and its ominous strength hangs over the world like a Sword of Damocles.

"This evil force lurks behind every act of the communists, gives sinister substance to their threats against the weak, and corroboration of their claims to progress to the world.

"Although we see a determined 'peace offensive' on the part of the Soviet Union, we must maintain our strength until its true motives become apparent. We note a tendency in some parts of the Free World to feel that Khrushchev's recent visit caused the development of a new international atmosphere which could lead to a changed relationship between the West and the Sino-Soviet bloc. While we feel this visit's over-all effect served the interests of the Free World, it must be recognized that it actually altered nothing substantive. It afforded no evidence of any sort of a shift in communist policy which could give us reason to abandon, in any particular, our strong position against Sino-Soviet coercion."

—Wilbur M. Brucker, *Secretary of the United States Army, in an address delivered on December 3, 1959.*

Received At Our Desk

World Security and Politics

The security of the Atlantic Community depends upon the ability and willingness of member states to cooperate in the establishment of an adequate military force, to coordinate national political and economic policies more effectively, and to implement the well known, oft-repeated adage—in unity there is strength. The still-born Heads of State Conference (May 16, 1960) demonstrated anew the futility of expecting any sudden liquidation of the cold war. It also showed clearly that too much must not be expected from short-term negotiations with the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is time for influential segments of the Western political community to realize that the security of the West is primarily a function of its own efforts at internal strengthening; it cannot rest upon an anticipated, perhaps wishful, moderation of Soviet objectives and policies.

Many studies have recently been published dealing with various aspects of the overall problem of promoting the security

of the Western world. Though differing in approach and emphasis, they all point out the need for more imaginative, better coordinated policies.

The Institute for Strategic Studies (London) was established in November, 1958, in order "to foster a series of independent appraisals of national or international strategic and military problems." The first study, written by its Director, Alastair Buchan, deals with the prospects and problems confronting *NATO in the 1960's*.

The study is based on three premises: first, the East-West antagonism is going to continue for some time to come; second, the most serious challenge facing the Nato nations, "is the diversification of the strength of the Soviet Bloc into many new forms of military, economic and political power"; and third, "the Nato countries should retain as much of their national sovereignty, in this new situation, as is compatible with the security and the flexibility of the Alliance as a whole."

Part I deals with the nature of the challenge: the wide range of alternatives available to Soviet leaders, the need of the Nato members to cope with revolutions and revolutionary situations throughout the non-Western world in such a fashion that they will not undermine Western security, the need of Nato to build a "much stronger capacity for limited war," and the need to place United States-Western European relations on a firmer, more viable basis.

In the second part of the book, the author discusses the implications of interdependence, with the principal emphasis placed on the military ingredient. His reasoning is cogent and convincing. He clearly presents the crucial issues and places them within an overall policy framework. He does correctly emphasize the fact that "whatever the size of the common

NATO IN THE 1960'S. By ALASTAIR BUCHAN (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. 131 pages, glossary, \$3.00.)

EUROPEAN ASSEMBLIES: THE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD, 1949-1959. By KENNETH LINDSAY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. 267 pages, appendices, \$7.50.)

THE YEARS OF CHALLENGE: THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1945-1958. By DON TAYLOR. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. 255 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.50.)

BLOC POLITICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS. By THOMAS HOVET, JR. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. 197 pages, charts and index, \$6.50.)

burden which the military and political requirements of the next decade impose on Nato, it can only be met by national policies of economic expansion."

Within Europe a number of important institutional developments demand particular attention. Kenneth Lindsay has brought together many of the papers delivered at the Hague Conference on European Assemblies and made available the principal findings and proposals in *European Assemblies: The Experimental Period, 1949-1959*. Six assemblies are treated: Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe; Common Assembly (now called the European Parliamentary Assembly); Nordic Council; Western European Union Assembly; Nato Parliamentarians' Conference; and the Benelux Consultative Parliamentary Council. A brief account of the six assemblies, their origins and significance is developed.

Succeeding chapters deal with the "stresses and strains" confronting the assemblies: for example, the nature of the conflicts existing between the assemblies and national parliaments; the "internal efficiency of Assemblies," "the role of political party groups," and so forth.

The appendices provide a number of valuable background papers presented by members of various national delegations. The student interested in learning of the problems and potential of European unity will find this a useful source book.

One of the major stumbling blocks to greater European unity has been the reluctance of Great Britain to enter economic or political arrangements which it feels might jeopardize its Commonwealth ties. However, under the pressure of growing competition from such regional intra-European organizations as the Coal and Steel Community and the "Big Six" trading complex, Britain is finding resistance to these movements increasingly difficult. It is seeking for ways in which to make its Commonwealth ties compatible with greater cooperation with West Europe.

Don Taylor, editor of *New Commonwealth*, the leading journal dealing with Commonwealth affairs, has written a book

on the "major events in the years between 1945 and 1958 bearing on the development of the Commonwealth and the British Empire." In his analysis, he traces the problems which the new nations of the Commonwealth have encountered in their evolution toward independence and democracy. *The Years of Challenge* is a survey of developments in Africa and Southeastern Asia; as such it is particularly useful for students of international relations. The author writes with ease and insight. His apparent first hand acquaintance with many Commonwealth leaders makes for an interesting account.

The development of regional blocs has affected the operation of the United Nations. In *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*, Thomas Hovet, Jr., analyzes this development and relates it to the diplomatic interests of the United States. He is concerned primarily with "the full extent to which blocs or groups exist as hard and fast groups within the organization." His study is based largely on extensive United Nations documentation. It is a solid piece of research, impressively buttressed with useful, informative charts.

The author carefully examines the evolution of the key blocs, the cohesive and divisive elements existing in each group, and the relationship of the blocs to the development of the General Assembly. He notes that ". . . Bloc politics in the United Nations has two particular features which invite speculation. In the first place, caucusing groups and blocs are to a considerable extent regional in character . . . secondly, at the moment, the individual blocs and groups appear to be primarily concerned with only a limited range of issues." In general, it can be assumed that bloc politics now constitutes a permanent, though informal, aspect of the U.N. machinery. "Thus each member must evaluate its policies and role in the United Nations with full awareness of the implications of . . . bloc and group development."

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Current Documents

The Truman Message on a United Nations Police Force

Speaking in San Francisco at the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, June 26, 1960, former United States President Harry S. Truman urged that the nations of the world make effective use of the United Nations. He appealed for the broadening of the powers of the United Nations and for the establishment of an international police force. The full text of his message follows:

A most important development within the last year has been the presentation before the United Nations General Assembly of a disarmament plan by the head of the Soviet Government, Nikita Khrushchev.

I thought it was the most important event of Khrushchev's visit because he considered the United Nations the proper place to deal with so vital an issue as disarmament. This is a forward step in Russian thinking about the United Nations. I regard this as a sign of the growth of the United Nations as a force in working out the problems of peace.

I would like to believe that the fact that he used the United Nations forum for the only concrete and public proposal of his visit is evidence of his esteem today for this international organization.

I hope that Khrushchev was not making just a grandstand play. But whether or not events reveal that Khrushchev made his proposal in good faith, the fact is that the United States is the one place where disarmament should be dealt with.

Disarmament, to succeed, should be a steady process of creating conditions which make it more and more difficult for any nation to break the peace. Effective disarmament should remove from the world not only the terror of nuclear weapons and guided missiles, but also the threat of mass armies.

Effective disarmament means an open world with no secret armies, no secret weapons and no secret war plans. If we are to achieve effective international control of armaments, we have to have every nation open to inspection.

This is what I said five years ago on the

occasion of the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. And in all the years since the founding of this international organization I have seen evidence of the continued need for service of the United Nations in the cause of peace.

New and ancient jealousies over sovereignty have made some of the work of the organization difficult and, at times, frustrating. As we have seen in Korea and in the Middle East, and as I hope we shall see in the Far East, the role of the United Nations has been more than theoretical and academic. It has been practical and effective. In my opinion, it has helped keep some explosive areas from plunging us all into a third World War.

I have felt from the very beginning, and my convictions have been confirmed by the experience of the United Nations to date, that we must have an international police force at the disposal of the United Nations.

The international police force must be strong enough to undertake such police action as the United Nations deems necessary to maintain the peace.

It is my belief that the sovereignty of no nation will be impaired. In reality, sovereignty of nations will be made more secure. The establishment of the international police force would require only the delegation of certain limited authority.

Time and experience will teach us just how much authority it will be necessary to delegate to the United Nations to make this international police force a more and more effective arm for helping keep the peace.

The United Nations today is a living in-

stitution. Like all living things, it follows a development of its own. Some of the things we put down on paper in the charter have not come to pass—some of the procedures originally planned have proved unworkable; but they have been replaced by new activities, new procedures, all within the spirit of the charter, that we did not foresee ten years ago. This is the course of all written constitutions if they are to endure and meet the changing needs of the years.

Fifteen years ago in San Francisco all the nations represented agreed on the goal of world peace. They also agreed that to achieve peace would require determination and effort. On that occasion I said:

If we had had this charter a few years ago—and above all the will to use it—millions now dead would be alive. If we should falter in the future in our will to use it, millions now living will surely die.

It has already been said by many that this is only a first step to a lasting peace. That is true. The important thing is that all our thinking and all our actions be based on the realization that it is in fact only a first step. Let us all have it firmly in mind that we start today from a good beginning, and, with our eye always on the final objective, let us march forward.

The question of armaments has clouded the international horizon for many years. It grows more and more serious. Every year science places new and more terrible weapons in our hands. Every year the financial burdens of defense grow heavier and heavier. Every year the consequences of sudden attack and the perils of inadequate defense become more deadly. Today, the battles of World War II are almost as far behind us technologically as the battles of Napoleon or the techniques of Genghis Khan. The use of force in international affairs today raises the threat—the almost incomprehensible threat—of total destruction, not only of cities and nations, but of all human life.

I earnestly hope that the time has come when we may break the deadlock on international disarmament.

A communiqué issued by President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev at the conclusion of their private meetings at Camp David stated, among other things, that no disputes would be settled by force.

There was nothing new in this declaration

that the Soviet Union was not already obligated to observe as a member of the United Nations.

The charter of the United Nations embodies the obligation of the members not to use force except in defense of the charter. This is both a legal and a moral obligation. It binds all the nations that signed and ratified the charter, even those that may be strong enough to violate it. It is a powerful, if intangible, restraint on all the member nations. It is sustained by the mighty force of the moral judgment of mankind.

Second only to peace in the United Nations Charter is the emphasis it lays on improving the standards of living of mankind and safeguarding the fundamental freedoms and the dignity of men. This work must be carried on at the same time that we strive to eliminate war. Indeed, this humanitarian program strikes at one of the main causes of war. It is a tribute to the framers of the United Nations Charter that they gave this objective such great importance, and set up machinery for pursuing it effectively even before the framework of international peace was completed.

One of the arguments that has gone on since the very beginning is that between the liberal constructionists and the strict constructionists. To the Soviet bloc, much that the United Nations has done is illegal, because it was accomplished in circumvention of the big-power veto. For this liberal interpretation, the United States is more responsible than any other nation, because the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 made it possible to switch the center of gravity from the Security Council to the General Assembly. The General Assembly then took over the direction of affairs in Korea, because it was clear that when the Russians returned to the Security Council they would block the Korean program in the Council.

A few weeks ago, another step taken for a liberal interpretation from the chair laid the ghost of the double veto. Ten members of the Security Council were to set up an investigating committee for Laos and they wanted to determine that the setting up of such a committee was a procedural matter, because the charter grants the Security Council the right to create subsidiary bodies to help the performance of its functions. The

Russians insisted that they could have a veto in the vote to determine whether or not the matter was procedural. The Security Council by a vote of ten to one swept such nonsense aside and thus laid the ghost of the double veto.

The United Nations has grown profoundly: First, through the liberal interpretation of the charter. The second way in which the United Nations has grown is by the addition of new bodies and the expansion of existing functions.

One of the greatest inspirations given the United Nations was the Point Four program, which led to the expanded technical-assistance program; the Paul Hoffman program for the special fund, and the agreement last fall to establish an international development authority as part of the International Bank (as recently suggested by Senator Mike Monroney). Thus a lasting effort is now going on to help under-developed areas.

The agency for the peace-time use of atomic energy is another addition to the United Nations family of agencies.

Another argument that has gone on in the United Nations has been over the question of the freedom of dependent areas. It is not too much of an oversimplification to say that the argument is between the colonial-minded and the others. The colonies in 1776 struck the first blow against the colonial system. Within the last fifteen years, over one-fourth the population of the world has thrown off the yoke of colonialism. And some of these nations were helped to independence by the United Nations, such as in the cases of Israel, Libya and Korea. In most of the cases, the new nations have been welcomed into the United Nations, where they have found an opportunity for self-expression. Indeed, I think if this great revolt against the colonial system has occurred in a world of anarchy, the dislocations might have been quite serious.

There are those conservative people who are afraid of what the new states will do. But just as we had a right to make our own mistakes in 1776, and it looked as though in what [John] Fiske has called "the critical period" our mistakes would destroy us, so the other new states have a right to make their mistakes. It is true that with the admission of so many new states into the United Na-

tions the United States does not have the automatic domination of the General Assembly that it did in the early days, but I have a feeling that if we always stand for human freedom and the right in the General Assembly, we will have no trouble in having a two-thirds majority with us. I think this has been demonstrated in the last few years. But I stress that we must be on the side of human freedom and our position must be right and, I might add, clearly expressed. So it is up to us to do right by the rest of the world—free and slave or dominated by totalitarians.

As I look back over the past years, I am encouraged by what has been done in the economic and social field. But all our accomplishments to date are only a good beginning. There is much that remains to be done. Here is a challenge to the understanding, the generosity and the ingenuity of man.

We now take it as a matter of course that one nation should offer scientific instruction and technical advances to another, free, without expecting a return of any kind except the consciousness of being part of the brotherhood of man. What a tremendous step forward this is in the realization of our common international responsibilities. Fifty years ago, a program of technical assistance would have been considered completely visionary. Nowadays, the only real question is—how big should such a program be? This revolutionary change in public opinion is the result, at least in part, of the economic and social portions of the United Nations Charter, and the general acceptance of their underlying philosophy.

I am glad to see that technical assistance and economic development are a growing part of the work of the United Nations. While all international good works need not be confined to the United Nations, there are many situations in which this organization is the best channel for such international activities. I hope all the member governments will support these activities of the United Nations wholeheartedly and generously.

In this nuclear age, no nation can live unto itself alone. There is no hope for any nation in isolationism or imperialism. The United Nations is the best hope of mankind for deliverance from mutual destruction.

Will you please be patient with me while

I repeat a statement or two from the speech I made here in San Francisco just fifteen years ago? While I am no prophet nor the son of one, my viewpoint fifteen years ago has not changed with regard to the United Nations, its effect on the peace of the world and the necessity for its existence to maintain that peace.

The charter, like our own Constitution, will be expanded and improved as time goes on. No one claims that it is now a final or a perfect instrument. It has not been poured into any fixed mold. Changing world conditions will require readjustment—but they will be the readjustments of peace and not of war.

There were many who doubted that agreement could ever be reached by these fifty countries differing so much in race and religion, in language and culture. But these differences were all forgotten in one unshakeable unity of determination—to find a way to end war.

Out of this conflict (World War II) have come powerful military nations, now fully trained and equipped for war. But they have no right to dominate the world. It is rather the duty of these powerful nations to assume the responsibility for leadership toward peace.

It [the United Nations] has set up machinery of international cooperation which men and nations of good will can use to help correct economic and social causes of conflict.

This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable.

Under this document, we have good reason to expect the framing of an international bill of rights, acceptable to all nations involved. That bill of rights will be as much a part of

international life as our own Bill of Rights is a part of our Constitution. The charter is dedicated to the achievement and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unless we can attain those objectives for all men and women everywhere—without regard to race, language or religion—we cannot have permanent peace and security.

Now here is what happened. The United Nations established a Commission on Human Rights, of which Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom I appointed to the Human Rights Commission, was the first chairman. It has produced a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This universal declaration was adopted in Paris on December 10, 1948, without a no vote. While the declaration was not ratified by the United Nations it has been incorporated into the Constitution of New States cited in United Nations resolutions and in court decisions. It has become a source of law, according to the United Nations Secretary General.

If we fail to use it, [the United Nations] we shall betray all those who have died in order that we might meet here in freedom and safety to create it.

If we seek to use it selfishly—for the advantage of any one nation, or any small group of nations—we shall be equally guilty of that betrayal.

The successful use of this instrument will require the united will and firm determination of the free peoples who have created it. The job will tax the moral strength and fiber of us all.

The United Nations is the permanent "summit." That's where conferences should be held.

United Nations Action in the Congo Crisis

The Republic of Congo (formerly the Belgian Congo) was formally declared a sovereign independent state on June 30, 1960. Shortly thereafter demonstrations of unrest began to mount. Following the outbreak of rebellion by mutinous Congolese soldiers on July 9, Belgian forces were sent in, immediately, to help restore order and to protect Belgian nationals. Premier Patrice Lumumba objected to Belgian interference and appealed, on July 12, for United Nations forces to assist the Congolese government in restoring order and ridding the nation of Belgian intervention. On July 14, the United Nations Security Council empowered United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to establish a United Nations force. The entire texts of the Congolese messages to the United

Nations, presented to that body for debate on June 13; excerpts from the Secretary General's report urging the creation of a United Nations force; and the complete Security Council resolution to give military aid follow:

CONGOLESE MESSAGES

First Message

The Government of the Republic of the Congo requests urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance. This request is justified by the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship signed between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo on June 29, 1960. Under the terms of that treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene on the express request of the Congolese government. No such request was ever made by the government of the Republic of the Congo and we therefore regard the unsolicited Belgian action as an act of aggression against our country.

The real cause of most of the disturbances can be found in colonialist machinations. We accuse the Belgian government of having carefully prepared the secession of the Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country. The government, supported by the Congolese people, refuses to accept a fait accompli resulting from a conspiracy between Belgian imperialists and a small group of Katanga leaders.

The overwhelming majority of the Katanga population is opposed to secession, which means the disguised perpetuation of the colonialist regime. The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the

national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression, which is a threat to international peace. We strongly stress the extremely urgent need for the dispatch of United Nations troops to the Congo.

Second Message

In connection with military assistance requested of [the] United Nations by the Republic of the Congo, the Chief of State and the Prime Minister of the Congo make the following clarification.

1. The purpose of the aid requested is not to restore [the] internal situation in [the] Congo but rather to protect the national territory against [an] act of aggression posed by Belgian metropolitan troops.

2. The request for assistance relates only to a United Nations force consisting of military personnel of neutral countries and not of [the] United States as reported by certain radio stations.

3. If requested assistance is not received without delay, the Republic of the Congo will be obliged to appeal to the Bandung Treaty powers.

4. The aid has been requested by the Republic of the Congo in the exercise of its sovereign rights and not in agreement with Belgium as reported.

HAMMARSKJOLD'S REPORT

The reason for my request, under Article 99, for an immediate meeting of the Security Council is the situation which has arisen in the newly independent Republic of the Congo.

The difficulties which have developed in the Congo are well known to all members of the Council. They are connected with the maintenance of order in the country and the protection of life. But the difficulties have an important international bearing as they are of a nature that cannot be disregarded by other countries.

I have received three communications from the government of the Congo. They are all three known to the members of the Security Council.

One is a request for urgent technical assistance in the field of administration, aiming especially at assistance in developing the security administration of the country. This request is within the limits of the competence of the Secretary General and I have sent it informally to the delegates, members of the Security Council, only because of its bearing on the general problem.

The other two communications are both related to a request for military assistance from the United Nations. One is the formal request, the other one is a clarification of this request and of the intentions of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. Both communications have been circulated as Security Council documents.

* * *

It is a matter of course that the only sound and lasting solution to the problem which has arisen is that the regular instruments of the government, in the first place its security administration, are rendered capable to take care of the situation. I understand the request for technical assistance to have been sent with this in view. My reaction, already communicated to the government of the Congo is entirely positive. A technical assistance office is being established and a resident representative appointed. I will submit to the government of the Congo today or tomorrow detailed proposals for implementation of my acceptance of the request. In formulating my proposals regarding technical assistance experts in the field of security administration, I have had the advantage of consulting the heads of a number of delegations of African member states.

* * *

As is well known, the Belgian government has in the Congo troops stated by the government to be maintained there in protection of life and for the maintenance of order. It is not for the Secretary General to pronounce himself on this action and its legal and political aspects, but I must conclude from the communications received from the govern-

ment of the Congo that the presence of these troops is a source of internal and potentially also of international tension. In these circumstances the presence of the Belgian troops cannot be accepted as a satisfactory stop-gap arrangement pending the re-establishment of order through the national security force.

* * *

It is, therefore, my conclusion that the United Nations should accede to the request of the government of the Congo and, in consequence, I strongly recommend to the Council to authorize the Secretary General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the government of the Congo, to provide the government with military assistance during the period which may have to pass before, through the efforts of the government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces are able to meet fully their tasks. It would be understood that were the United Nations to act as proposed, the Belgian government would see its way to a withdrawal.

... It follows that the United Nations force would not be authorized to action beyond self-defense. It follows further that they may not take any action which would make them a party to internal conflicts in the country.

Finally, the selection of personnel should be such as to avoid complications because of the nationalities used. In the prevailing situation this does not, in my view, exclude the use of units from African states, while, on the other hand, it does exclude recourse to troops from any of the permanent members of the Security Council.

In conclusion, I must invite the Council to act with the utmost speed. . . .

A U.N. FORCE SENT TO THE CONGO

The Security Council,

Considering the report of the Secretary General on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo,

Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (document S/4382),

1. Calls upon the government of Belgium to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo;

2. Decides to authorize the Secretary General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the government, to meet fully their tasks;

3. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

HAMMARSKJOLD'S PROGRESS REPORT

On July 18, Secretary General Hammarskjold reported to the Security Council on the United Nations Force created to assist the Congolese government in restoring order. Excerpts from this report follow:

* * *

State of Implementation

I now turn to the detailed information which, at the present moment, can be given to the Council regarding the implementation of its decision.

At the time of the writing of this report, about 3,500 troops in addition to substantial equipment from four of the contributing countries have arrived in Leopoldville. The 3,500 consist of 460 troops from Ethiopia, 770 troops from Ghana, 1,250 troops from Morocco and 1,020 troops from Tunisia. Each of the battalions is well equipped. As stated above, offers have also been accepted from the Republic of Guinea and the Federation of Mali. Groups of some 700 men will be air-lifted later this week from Guinea.

Six hundred and thirty-five men of the

Swedish battalion in U.N.E.F. will be air-lifted to Leopoldville on July 20 to serve for one month in the Congo; a small rear party of the battalion will remain in Gaza. Meanwhile, arrangements are being made for the airlifting of other contingents for the Force, including police units, hospital units, and signals and logistics personnel.

* * *

The general disorder combined with the breakdown of transportation and public services led to a threatened food shortage which it was necessary to avert. Consequently, at the request of the Government of the Congo, I made appeals to the Governments of Canada, Denmark, France, India, Italy, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America for food. The response to this appeal has been generous. . . .

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

A lengthy statement was delivered on July 20 by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Wigny, before the United Nations Security Council, denouncing Congolese charges against the Belgian government and listing reported Congolese atrocities committed against Belgian nationals. Excerpts from the foreign minister's statement and from the Tunisian and Italian speeches made on July 21 during the Security Council debate on the Congo situation are reprinted below:

The Belgian Statement

* * *

Gentlemen, the subject of the complaint is not that we are aggressive but that we are madmen, that we are captured by collective madness. . . .

The representative of the Congo is prompted by good feelings, and I pay this tribute to him, but I believe that his memory is not quite accurate and his history contains certain gaps. . . .

Now, gentlemen, may I tell you the story?

It is an interesting one to hear. You see, we arrived in Belgium at a pathetic moment in our national history. We know, too, that it is a pathetic moment in the history of the world.

Rarely has a people done what we have done. After having done for the Congo all that the representative of the Republic of the Congo has just recalled, we decided in eighteen months to grant independence to the Congo.

* * *

Belgium has recognized the independence of the Congo without restrictions, as complete and total independence. And we hope that this realistic policy, which is today to the honor of Belgium throughout the world, will lead to a cooperation that will be lasting and fruitful between two independent, sovereign, equal peoples bound by friendship.

* * *

And do you believe that it is simply a ques-

tion of panic which started on the Fourth and that these are mere stories? I shall read to you now . . . the first conclusions . . . of the commission of inquiry which we have just set up under the chairmanship of a Magistrate of the Court of Justice. * * *

. . . One woman was attacked, assaulted. Another was pregnant. Another had a miscarriage and they were taken from their beds under the threat of bodily assault.

More women were bodily attacked. Mme. C. arrested by ten soldiers of the Force de Publique at her home on the 9th of July, 1960. She was kicked all over her body. She was drawn by her hair and thus pulled down to the ground. At 23 hours four soldiers, one of them an African sub-officer, compelled her to work for twelve hours under the threat of their arms. She was assaulted bodily on three occasions by three different soldiers. * * *

Mme. K. left Leopoldville on the 7th of July at about 23 hours. She met a caravan. Four women were part of a convoy. They were abused by fifteen to seventeen different Africans. They were in a regrettable state.

They saw jeeps loaded with African soldiers who shot at random into the crowd.

A priest, after having narrated these events of the 4th of July, declared that on the 6th of July three military Belgian officials were seriously molested to the extent that one received extreme unction.

* * *

I do not mean to imply that the Congolese people participated. The Congolese people . . . remained apart from these horrors. But the truth is that mutinous troops were no longer under . . . control and that . . . [the] government has done nothing and has been able to do nothing in order to reconstitute the troops.

No doubt we have received appeals for calmness, the desire to remain on the spot, the withdrawal of our troops. We are told "withdraw your troops within two hours" at the very time when such things are happening. We are told after these two hours "you can be sure that there will be calmness."

I appeal now to the Secretary General: would he now dare to give us such a guarantee at Stanleyville, in all the cities in the lower Congo, in the larger part of our Africa?

* * *

The Tunisian Statement

The Foreign Minister of Belgium told us yesterday the horrible details of the atrocities committed by Congolese troops against certain Belgians. We have said, and we repeat, that we deplore these and sincerely regret them, but these facts have not been verified by an impartial body. The truth of the matter seems to be that the Belgian population, and all the European population in the Congo, was in the throes of general panic, which might well be understandable. It may be timely to recall that, if there were twenty deaths to mourn, 20,000 Belgians left the Congo without danger.

* * *

Calm and peace seem to be returning. But there are two important questions whose existence keeps the situation grave and fraught with consequences. These two problems are, on the one hand, the persistence of the Belgian government in maintaining its troops on the territory of the republic, and on the other, the threat of the disintegration of this young republic, a threat which takes on all appearance of becoming an effort to take away with the left hand what was given by the right.

I recall, first of all, that on July 13* the Security Council, by a resolution against which no negative vote was cast, urged . . . the Belgian government to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo. But until this very day the Council has had no evidence that the said troops have left the Congo.

The Belgian government has thought to justify the presence of these troops in the Congo by the necessity of insuring order and safeguarding the security of persons of European origin, especially Belgian nationals.

I did not, and do not now, refuse to believe that there may be sincere feelings which may lead the Belgian government to concern itself with any danger that may threaten its nationals in the Republic of the Congo. This is honest, this is legitimate, this is quite understandable. But these feelings, no matter how well we may understand them, still cannot justify the sending of Belgian troops to the Republic of the Congo against the will

*This resolution was dated July 13, but was not approved until the following day.

of the government legitimately and democratically established in this country when Belgium itself recognized the full and complete independence of the Republic of the Congo. * * *

This brings me to the second threat which, for the last few days has been hanging over the Congo—the attempt to bring about the disintegration of the young Congolese republic through division and discord. A province of the country, Katanga, in point-of fact is showing a tendency to separate itself from the rest of the republic. That would be a purely Congolese affair if there were not certain parallels between the intervention of Belgium in the Congo and the very nature of Katanga itself, on the one hand, and the manifestation of this tendency on the other hand.

This region, in fact, is the region where the greatest mineral wealth lies and where Belgian investments are considerable. It will be noted, moreover, that this tendency towards disunion was made public the day after the intervention of Belgian paratroops in this region against the will of the government of the Congo.

We cannot understand the real reasons why the Belgian troops intervened on the pretext of saving Belgian lives, since in everyone's opinion the situation in Katanga was calm. It appears therefore that this intervention was designed to allow Katanga to separate itself from the rest of the Congo.

* * *

The Italian Statement

My delegation feels in fact that there is still need of protection of the European communities, among which is the Italian one. It is a proved fact that due to the collapse of the security structure, European lives were lost, properties were damaged, cruelties were inflicted. . . .

Everybody including Belgium, agrees that the presence of the Belgian troops is only a temporary measure and that the Belgian troops, insuring order today have to be withdrawn.

We can trust the Belgians, when they said that they only intervened for humanitarian reasons for an emergency mission because their purpose is not to reinstate control . . . that they voluntarily relinquished. . . .

The withdrawal will take place as soon as possible; Mr. Wigny, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Belgium, gave us, last night, the assurance that the withdrawal, already begun, will continue in conjunction with the United Nations' control of the situation. And, on the other side, Mr. Kanza, the Congolese Minister, has reaffirmed that his government is only anxious to see its country grow in peace and independence, and resume its friendship with Belgium.

All this, through the great effort of the United Nations and with the help of the United Nations, can be achieved and quickly. Only one condition: That no outside intervention take place.

* * *

U.N. RESOLUTION URGING BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL

On July 22, 1960, the United Nations Security Council, at the close of a 2-day debate, unanimously approved a resolution urging the "speedy" withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo. However, this resolution fails to put a time limit on Belgian evacuation. The full text follows:

The Security Council,

Having considered the first report by the Secretary General on the implementation of Security Council resolution S/4387 of July 14, 1960 (Document S/4389),

Appreciating the work of the Secretary General and the support so readily and so speedily given to him by all member states invited by him to give assistance,

Noting that as stated by the Secretary Gen-

eral the arrival of the troops of the United Nations Force in Leopoldville has already had a salutary effect,

Recognizing that an urgent need still exists to continue and to increase such efforts,

Considering that the complete restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo would effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recognizing that the Security Council recommended the admission of the Republic of the Congo to membership in the United Nations as a unit,

Calls upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of July 14, 1960, on the withdrawal of their troops and authorizes the Secretary General to take all necessary action to this effect;

Requests all states to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority

and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;

Commends the Secretary General for the prompt action he has taken to carry out resolution S/4387 of the Security Council and his first report;

Invites the specialized agencies of the United Nations to tender to the Secretary General such assistance as he may require;

Requests the Secretary General to report further to the Security Council as appropriate.

(Continued from p. 170)

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN. (New York: Random House, 1960. 457 pages, bibliography, chronology and index, \$6.50.)

This collection of readings in Soviet foreign policy constitutes a new approach to the study of the U.S.S.R. Tracing Soviet attitudes and tactics through the texts of speeches, statutes and other documents, the author shows how Soviet ideology was tailor made to fit Soviet policy.

The author has divided his material into historical periods. Three non-chronological chapters deal with Soviet policy as it has faced the problems of disarmament, colonialism and expansion into underdeveloped areas. Alvin Rubinstein shows, from the wealth of original source material excerpted here, that Soviet foreign policy faces an inherent two-fold dilemma. On the one hand, "only world revolution could guarantee national security; yet national security was essential for the eventual success of world revolution. This dualism—the furthering of world revolution and the quest for national security—has remained a salient feature of Soviet foreign policy."

This book is an invaluable contribution to the study of Soviet foreign policy. Both the student and lay reader alike will benefit from the author's analytical and penetrating commentaries preceding each of the periods and problems covered. With knowledge and skill, Rubinstein gives the reader an appreciation of the tortuous

trail that Soviet policy makers have blazed. The selections are well chosen and well coordinated. In addition, the final chapter includes articles by leading Soviet scholars assessing Soviet policy and the problems it creates for East-West negotiations.

THE SECURITY OF THE FREE WORLD. EDITED BY JULIEN ENGEL. (New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1960. 210 pages and bibliography, \$2.50.)

This book is centered around the topic chosen for the national high school debate for 1960-1961: How can the security of the free world best be maintained? It is a collection of carefully selected readings on the major issue of the post World War II era, the cold war. The author is to be commended for the wide range of materials, their scope and quality, that he has incorporated into a single volume.

Dealing with six of the questions central to any realistic debate on the defense of the free world, the author prefaces each chapter with an introduction to the readings. Chapter I is an examination of "East Versus West"; Chapter II discusses "The United Nations"; Chapter III, "Nato at the Crossroads"; Chapter IV, "World Law and World Government"; Chapter V, "Can the Arms Race Be Checked?"; and Chapter VI, "The Underdeveloped Nations: The North-South Problem."

The readings in this book are of a sophisticated nature and will prove useful to the student and lay reader concerned about growing international unrest.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

July 8—Ending his visit to Austria, Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev warns that if the West German Bundestag meets in West Berlin in September, he will perhaps consider this an appropriate time to sign a peace treaty with East Germany. (See also *Austria*.)

July 29—*Tass*, official Soviet press agency, discloses that in notes to Britain, France and the U.S., the Soviet Union has protested a West German law providing for a radio control headquarters in West Berlin. The Soviet notes declare that West Berlin cannot be governed by West Germany.

July 31—The U.S., British and French Allied occupation authorities in West Berlin refuse to allow the application of a West German law forbidding the distribution of Communist propaganda in the Allied sectors of Berlin.

Congo Crisis

July 6—Elements of the Congo's army mutiny against their Belgian officers. Although the government promises a general promotion in grade and removal of some white officers, the unrest continues.

July 10—Belgian paratroopers battle mutinous Congolese troops. At least 13,000 white residents are reported to have left the country during the week. Premier Patrice Lumumba protests the intervention of Belgian troops and vows to defend the Congo from outside influences.

July 11—Katanga, the Congo's richest province, declares itself an independent state. Premier Moise Tshombe says Belgian troops will remain in his province.

July 12—It is reported that the Congo has asked for U.S. troops.

The U.S. says, in answer to an appeal from the Congolese Cabinet for Ameri-

can troops, that assistance should come through the U.N. and not unilaterally through any one country.

Premier Patrice Lumumba of the Congo asks U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to provide military assistance to his government.

July 13—In notes delivered to the Moscow embassies of Belgium, the U.S., Britain, France and West Germany, the U.S.S.R. demands withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo.

The Security Council holds an urgent meeting to consider proposals to send a U.N. force to the Congo after receiving a second cablegram from Lumumba asking help to halt Belgian "aggression."

The Belgian government announces after a Cabinet meeting that it intends to keep its troops at key points in the Congo for an undetermined period despite a Congolese demand that Belgian units return to their recognized bases.

Belgian commandos occupy Leopoldville's airport and clash with Congolese troops interfering with evacuation of Belgian citizens.

July 14—By a vote of 8-0, the Security Council authorizes Hammarskjold to assemble and send a U.N. force to the Congo and calls for the withdrawal of Belgian forces in the area. The Secretary General asks the Soviet Union, the U.S., Britain, Italy and India to provide food and transportation for the U.N. forces. (See also page 174 ff. of this issue.)

The Katanga Provincial Assembly ratifies secession from the Congo.

July 15—U.N. troops begin arriving in the Congo and Lumumba calls for the "immediate withdrawal" of all Belgian forces. He declares the Congo is at war with Belgium and says he has the backing of the Cabinet and Parliament for breaking off all relations with Belgium.

In a message to Congolese leaders, Premier Khrushchev declares that the Soviet Union will take strong counter-measures unless the West ceases "intervening" in the Congo. The news agency *Tass* says the message is in response to a Congolese telegram yesterday complaining that Belgian troops have occupied Congolese territory and asking for Russian aid.

Belgium sharply rejects a Soviet note charging it with aggression in the Congo. The Soviet embassy in Brussels terms the note an "insult" and returns it.

July 18—Hammarskjold informs the Security Council that Belgian authorities in the Congo have agreed to abide by the orders of the U.N. Command and will limit military intervention to protection of Belgian nationals. He says that a force of 3,500, recruited from African states, is on the spot and has done much to ease tensions.

Premier Lumumba issues an ultimatum to the U.N. to get Belgian troops out of the Congo within 24 hours; otherwise he will call in Soviet troops.

The Congolese Senate votes unanimously to reject Soviet military intervention.

Premier Tshombe demands U.N. recognition of Katanga. He says he will not allow U.N. forces to set foot in his province but invites U.N. observers to see that the Belgians are maintaining order.

July 19—Tension eases as U.N. troops take over major areas of Leopoldville and Belgian troops start withdrawing. It is reported that the Congolese Senate votes to oppose the breaking off of relations with Belgium.

The U.S.S.R. demands that the U.S. withdraw 20 of its soldiers in the Congo who are assisting the airlift of the U.N. force. The U.S., insisting that the 100, not 20, Americans in the Congo are there under U.N. auspices, accuses the U.S.S.R. of trying to make trouble in the Congo.

July 20—Premier Lumumba says his Cabinet has decided "to appeal immediately to the Soviet Union or any other country of the African-Asian bloc to send troops to the Congo" if the U.N. takes no effective action to expel Belgian troops at once.

July 22—After sharp U.S.-Soviet exchanges, the Security Council votes unanimously to call on Belgium to withdraw its troops "speedily" from the Congo.

July 23—U.N. officials report that there will be more than 12,000 troops in the Congo within a week and that 6,000 soldiers are already there. Nine countries, all but two of them African nations, have pledged contingents.

The last Belgian troops leave Leopoldville and U.N. troops patrol the city.

July 24—Lumumba confers at U.N. headquarters for 2 hours with Hammarskjold.

July 25—At a N.Y. news conference, Lumumba says Congo peace would be restored "within 5 minutes" after withdrawal of Belgian troops. He says these troops must also be withdrawn from Katanga and from Kamina and Kitona, bases reserved by Belgium under its treaty with the Congo.

Premier Tshombe says any U.N. troops entering Katanga will first have to fire upon Katanga troops.

July 26—At the U.N., Lumumba meets with Hammarskjold. A communiqué issued by the 2 leaders announces that the U.N. will send administrative and technical assistance experts to help out Congolese reorganization.

Hammarskjold departs for Belgium to confer with the authorities there.

It is reported that Belgian paratroopers were sent into a town in Kasai Province to protect its European residents.

July 27—Premier Patrice Lumumba, at a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter in Washington, presses again his request for assistance (technical and financial) to strengthen his government. Secretary Herter pledges U.S. aid to the Congo Republic through the U.N.

The Belgian government tells Hammarskjold that it will consider the question of Belgian bases in the Congo only after order has been restored.

July 28—Hammarskjold arrives in the Congo. Sources at the Belgian embassy declare that Belgian troops will withdraw as U.N. troops take control of critical Congo areas.

July 29—Lumumba leaves Washington.

The Belgian government announces that it is recalling 1,500 of its 10,000-man force from the Congo; the withdrawn troops will arrive in Belgium on August 2. July 30—The Congo Cabinet, in talks with Hammarskjold, insists on the immediate dispatch of U.N. troops to Katanga province—a step opposed by Belgium. It is reported that yesterday Hammarskjold asked the Cabinet for more time in dealing with the Katanga question.

A joint communiqué issued by Hammarskjold and the Congo Cabinet discloses the creation of a ministerial council to work closely with the Secretary General.

Lumumba meets in Ottawa with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker.

Hammarskjold declares that an agreement with the Congo regarding U.N. forces in the Congo has been signed.

The Cuban Crisis (See also *International, U.N., Cuba, and U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

July 9—Soviet Premier Khrushchev threatens to retaliate with rockets if the U.S. intervenes militarily in Cuba.

July 11—Cuba asks the Security Council to take action on her charge that the U.S. has interfered in her internal affairs and has committed “economic aggression.”

July 12—Khrushchev contends at a news conference that the Monroe Doctrine is dead and promises to back up Cuba in any effort to get rid of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo.

July 14—The U.S. State Department asserts that the Monroe Doctrine is as valid today as it was 137 years ago and denounces Khrushchev’s “naked menace to world peace.”

July 18—The Council of the O.A.S. agrees unanimously to hold a foreign ministers’ meeting on differences between the U.S. and Cuba. Cuba assents on condition it agrees on the agenda, site and time for the meeting.

The Cuban Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, denounces the U.S. for “economic aggression” and demands that the Security Council take “the necessary measures.” Ecuador and Argentina introduce a resolution under which the Security Council would postpone consideration of the Cuban

charges until after the Organization of American States makes its report.

July 19—By a vote of 9 to 0, with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining, the Security Council refers Cuba’s charges against the U.S. to the O.A.S.

Disarmament

July 2—In a note delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the U.S. blames the U.S.S.R. for breaking off the 10-power disarmament talks. The U.S. urges Russia to consider returning to the meetings. (See also *Austria*, July 1.)

July 12—In a bid to break the Geneva nuclear testing deadlock, the U.S. proposes the creation of a pool of Western and Soviet nuclear explosive devices open to inspection and testing by both East and West.

July 19—In a lecture delivered to an outside group, Semyon K. Tsarapkin, Soviet negotiator at the nuclear test-ban conference, terms “absolutely unacceptable” the U.S. plan for an East-West pool of nuclear testing devices.

July 26—At the nuclear test ban conference held by Britain, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the Soviet delegate agrees to 3 annual on-site inspections inside Soviet Russia to enforce a ban on nuclear testing.

July 27—It is announced that the U.S.S.R. has refused to resume the Geneva disarmament talks.

July 28—The President of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo (of Mexico), is reported to have sent letters to delegates to the 10-nation Geneva disarmament talks suggesting that meetings resume August 15. The talks were disrupted on June 27 when the Soviet delegation walked out.

The RB-47 Plane Incident

July 11—The Soviet Union tells the U.S. that a missing U.S. reconnaissance plane was shot down over Soviet territorial waters in the Arctic on July 1. The note of “strong protest” against “a new gross violation” of Soviet air space says the U.S.S.R. is holding 2 survivors from a crew of 6 for trial.

July 12—Soviet Premier Khrushchev accuses

the U.S. and its allies of "provoking serious military conflict" by continuing reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.

In a strongly worded note, the U.S. charges that Moscow "wantonly attacked" the RB-47 reconnaissance bomber. The note asserts that the plane never flew closer than 30 miles to Soviet territory.

July 15—The Soviet Union rejects as "sheer invention" the U.S. contention that the downed RB-47 was over international waters when it was shot down.

July 19—Great Britain, in a note rejecting a Soviet charge of "complicity" in U.S. aerial espionage, accuses the U.S.S.R. of bearing a "heavy responsibility" in the destruction of the RB-47 "in international air space."

July 25—As the Security Council continues debate on the RB-47 incident, the U.S. presents a resolution calling for an investigation of the facts by an international commission and referral of the matter to the International Court of Justice.

July 26—In debate on the flight of an American RB-47 plane over the Barents Sea, close to Soviet borders on July 1, the U.N. Security Council rejects a Soviet resolution condemning the U.S. flight. The U.S.S.R. vetoes the U.S. resolution asking for an investigation of the incident.

The European Economic Community (The Common Market)

July 7—The Executive Commission of the Common Market presents to the 6-member governments its final proposals for a common farm policy, envisioning almost complete free trade in farm products among members by 1967.

International Transport Workers Federation

July 29—In a resolution adopted at its twenty-sixth congress, the I.T.W.F. warns the U.A.R. to stop interfering with Suez Canal shipping.

Nordic Council

July 28—At the eighth annual meeting of the Nordic Council attended by the Premiers of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland, the Council debates whether the association is still viable.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

July 22—High officials of 20 nations meet in Paris to draft a charter for the new O.E.C.D. The main tasks of the new group will be consideration of aid to underdeveloped countries and consultation on economic policies. The U.S. and France concede that trade matters should play a prominent role in the new organization.

Organization of American States (See also Cuban Crisis.)

July 8—By a vote of 19 to 0, the O.A.S. agrees to call a meeting of Western Hemisphere foreign ministers to hear Venezuela's complaint against the Dominican Republic. It also authorizes the sending of a committee to investigate charges that the Dominican Republic assisted in an assassination attempt against Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt.

July 20—The fact-finding commission of the O.A.S. completes its investigation of Venezuela's charges accusing the Dominican Republic of organizing the assassination attempt against President Betancourt.

The United Nations (See also Congo Crisis, Cuban Crisis, and RB-47 Plane Incident.)

July 11—A ministerial meeting of the Economic and Social Council starts in Geneva. U.S. Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon warns new nations that trade deals with the Communist bloc could jeopardize their independence.

July 14—The Soviet Union announces at the Economic and Social Council meeting that it will give 2.5 million rubles (\$625,000) for aid to the new African states "within the framework of the U.N. and on a voluntary basis."

ARGENTINA

July 19—Argentina delivers a note to Israel expressing dissatisfaction with the Israeli delay in making "adequate reparations" for the kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann.

July 22—As a result of the Eichmann case, Argentina declares Israeli Ambassador Arieh Levavi persona non grata.

AUSTRIA

July 1—On a 9-day state visit to Austria,

Khrushchev tells a Viennese audience that the West "torpedoed" the Geneva disarmament conference. (See also *International, Disarmament*.)

July 6—Khrushchev warns Austria that her neutrality will be imperiled if the U.S. uses its rocket bases in northern Italy against the Communist world.

In Vienna the embassies of the U.S. and West Germany deliver protests to Austria over Khrushchev attacks on their countries during his tour.

July 7—Austria announces it will ask the 1960 session of the U.N. General Assembly to endorse "a true autonomy" for the German-speaking inhabitants of the South Tyrol.

July 9—The U.S. and West Germany protest against the Austrian government's passivity in the face of Khrushchev attacks upon their countries.

July 12—The Cabinet formally rejects a pledge by Premier Khrushchev to protect Austria's neutrality. It also rejects American and West German protests against Khrushchev's anti-Western remarks.

July 15—Ending a 2-day discussion of economic matters with the Austrian government, U.S. Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon says the most realistic way to adjust the differences between the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association, to which Austria belongs, is to negotiate agreements on specific commodities.

BELGIUM (See *International, Congo Crisis*)

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE

Canada

July 12—The Canada-U.S. Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense begins talks in Ottawa on making nuclear weapons available to Canada.

Ceylon

July 20—In voting for a new Parliament, the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party and its allies win an overwhelming victory over the ruling United National party.

July 21—Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike is sworn in as prime minister. She will also be foreign minister and minister of defense.

Ghana

July 29—Ghana announces a complete economic boycott of South African goods, beginning August 1. South African shipping and airplane lines are not permitted to enter Ghana. Any South African wishing entry to Ghana must first declare his opposition to apartheid. South Africa will lose more than \$6 million in business from Ghana yearly.

Great Britain (See also *Germany, West.*)

July 6—Aneurin Bevan, former leader of the left wing of the Labor party, dies.

July 12—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan tells Commons that he will discuss with U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower modification or improvement of the U.S. agreement concerning air bases in Britain.

July 14—The U.S. agrees to give Britain advance notice of Air Force flights from British bases that might be interpreted as provocative by Moscow.

July 22—Derek C. Walker-Smith, minister of health since 1957, unexpectedly resigns.

July 25—Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd tells Commons there is no likelihood of Britain joining the European Common Market for some time. Labor spokesmen support the government's position.

July 27—In a Cabinet reorganization, Lord Home is named Foreign Secretary, succeeding Selwyn Lloyd. Lloyd takes up the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Other changes are also announced.

July 28—Speaking before the House of Commons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan defends his choice of the Earl of Home as foreign secretary.

India

July 11—Ignoring a plea by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, thousands of government employees go on strike to support a demand for a minimum monthly wage of 125 rupees (\$26.25).

July 15—India signs an agreement with the Soviet Union to import 1.5 million tons of Soviet oil in the next 4 years.

July 16—Union leaders call off the strike of government workers after 12 persons are killed and 9,000 arrested.

July 26—Naga tribal leaders meet with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to

urge the creation of Nagaland as a separate state of India.

July 27—It is made public that in 2 weeks of violence and mob rioting in Assam over the desire to make Assamese the official language of the state government, some 55,000 persons have been rendered homeless; 7,000 houses burned; and 13 killed.

July 29—The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announces a \$70 million loan for the expansion of Indian railway facilities.

July 30—Dr. Inkongliba Ao, Naga tribal leader, declares that Nehru has agreed "in principle" with Naga demands for a separate state within India.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE Cyprus

July 1—A joint communiqué announces that full agreement has been reached on the military bases to be retained by Britain when Cyprus becomes independent. Independence Day is set for August 16.

July 14—The British House of Commons gives the conclusive second reading to the bill granting independence to Cyprus.

July 31—Voting takes place for the first House of Representatives of the Cyprus Republic.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

July 19—The government of Southern Rhodesia arrests 3 top leaders of the National Democratic party, successor to the banned African National Congress.

July 20—Protesting the arrest of African leaders, 20,000 natives march on the center of Salisbury and are dispersed by police riot squads.

July 24—Thousands of Africans riot in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, after an African political meeting is banned.

July 25—The Nyasaland constitutional conference opens in London to chart the "orderly evolution" of the protectorate toward political democracy.

July 26—Six Africans are reported killed in Bulawayo, five of them by police shots. Some 120 Africans are wounded when police fire on rioters. Violence arose last week after the national Democratic party was outlawed and three of its leaders arrested.

July 28—In London at the Nyasaland constitutional conference, it is reported that 2 tribal chiefs have asserted that Nyasaland is not ready for self-rule.

July 29—British Secretary of State for the Colonies Iain Macleod tells the Nyasaland conference that Africans must be given a greater role in Nyasaland's government. Macleod favors widening the franchise to include more Africans, but does not advocate universal suffrage.

Nigeria

July 8—The first African to be appointed governor of a British colonial territory, Sir Adesoji Aderemi, is sworn in as governor of Western Nigeria.

July 15—The Nigerian independence bill receives its conclusive second reading in the British House of Commons without opposition.

CAMEROON, REPUBLIC OF

July 26—President Ahmadou Ahidjo of the Cameroon, former French trust territory, arrives in Paris for a state visit.

July 27—Ahidjo denies all reports that the Cameroon might join the French Community.

CHINA, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

July 26—Communist Chinese and Indian delegates end 6 weeks of talks in Peking on settling their border fight.

CONGO REPUBLIC, THE (See *International, Congo Crisis*)

CUBA (See also *International, Cuban Crisis*.)

July 1—The government seizes the last 2 foreign-owned oil refineries.

July 6—The Council of Ministers decrees changes in the 1959 Castro Constitution and sets up machinery to permit seizure of industrial, banking and commercial operations owned by Americans.

July 7—Premier Fidel Castro attacks the U.S. sugar quota cut as "imperialistic" and accuses the U.S. of economic aggression. (See *U.S. Foreign Policy*, July 6.)

July 9—All American-owned companies are ordered to present sworn statements showing fuels, lubricants, spare parts and raw materials in stock.

Pledging the fullest support of Cuba, Khrushchev threatens to retaliate with rockets if the U.S. intervenes there militarily.

July 11—The Cuban ambassador to West Germany, Dr. Eric Aguero Montoro, accusing Castro of establishing a Communist dictatorship, resigns. He seeks political asylum in the U.S.

July 15—A 14-man Communist Chinese trade mission arrives in Havana to negotiate an agreement involving the purchase of substantial amounts of sugar.

July 16—The U.S. officially protests against Cuba's nationalization law and against the harassment and imprisonment of American newsmen.

July 17—Fighting breaks out in Havana after a Roman Catholic mass attacking "persecution under Communist regimes" is attended by hundreds.

July 18—Police fire into the air to break up the second anti-Communist demonstration in 2 days.

July 20—The government reports that Cuba will receive U.S. dollars for 20 per cent of the payment for the 700,000 tons of sugar purchased by the Soviet Union at 3.25 cents a pound. The balance is to be in Soviet merchandise.

July 21—The Castro regime seizes 2 of the largest U.S.-owned sugar mills in Cuba.

The 35-nation International Sugar Council increases world export quotas to enable Cuba to sell elsewhere the sugar cancelled by the U.S.

Defense Minister Raul Castro leaves Moscow. A communiqué says the entire Communist world will assist Cuba in breaking any economic blockade the U.S. may impose.

July 22—A third U.S.-owned sugar mill is seized by the government.

July 23—Communist China agrees to buy 500,000 tons of sugar from Cuba annually for the next 5 years at the world price. Cuba will receive 20 per cent of the payments in dollars and the rest in Chinese merchandise.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

July 6—The third 5-Year Plan is announced. The people are promised more pay, a reduction of the work week and more schools

and houses. The new plan calls for an over-all increase of 56 per cent in industrial production.

July 16—The new constitution becomes effective this week. The official name of the country is changed to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and more power is centralized in Prague with all major matters for Slovakia under the control of the central government.

EL SALVADOR

July 29—The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announces that it has granted El Salvador a \$3,840,000 loan for a hydroelectric project.

FRANCE

July 2—Vincent Auriol, former president of France, sends a letter to the Constitutional Council protesting allegedly unconstitutional acts by President Charles de Gaulle. These are measures vastly increasing state aid to denominational schools, the refusal to convene Parliament in March in special session despite a request by a majority of Deputies, and the short-cut procedure used to revise the Constitution on the structure of the French community.

July 30—It is reported by spokesmen for both sides that the 2-day, de Gaulle-Adenauer talks have been successful and that the 2 leaders have agreed that European political union should be effected through "cooperation among governments." (See also *West Germany*.)

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

July 4—The Algerian Provisional Government rejects conditions set down by France for prospective peace talks. The rebels offer to send envoys back to Paris if France removes those conditions curbing freedom of movement and communication of Algerian delegates negotiating in Paris.

July 31—Algerian rebels open fire on a crowd of over 1,000 people at Caroubier beach.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE

July 11—Agreements giving complete sovereignty to the Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey and Voltaic Republics are signed

in Paris by leaders of the 4 African republics and French Premier Michel Debré. The agreements must be ratified by the French and African Parliaments.

July 12—France and the leaders of the Congo, Chad and Central African Republics sign independence agreements. The 3 republics comprising the Union of Central African Republics also sign cooperation agreements with France.

July 15—Accords giving independence to the Republic of Gabon and agreements for cooperation are signed in Paris.

July 28—It is reported that French President Charles de Gaulle has agreed to grant Mauritania complete independence on November 28, thus completing the evolution of the 12 autonomous overseas states of the French Community into fully sovereign nations remaining within the Community.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

July 1—Nine of the fifteen right-wing German party members of the Bundestag, including two federal ministers, announce they are joining the ruling Christian Democratic Union.

July 13—West Berlin's Mayor Willy Brandt warns Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that yielding to Soviet objections to a fall meeting of the West German Bundestag planned in his city could have serious effects. (See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

July 29—Adenauer, in Paris, confers with French President de Gaulle over differences in their approaches to West European integration. (See also *France*.)

July 30—It is announced that British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan will visit Adenauer on August 10.

GUATEMALA

July 19—In the wake of a theatre bombing, an attack on a military base and a strike of high school teachers and students, the government imposes a 30-day state of siege and suspends 13 constitutional rights.

INDONESIA

July 8—The Communist party, pressing for a Cabinet shuffle, brands the record of the Cabinet's first year a complete failure.

July 21—President Sukarno tells anti-Communist opposition leaders their 2 parties may be banned unless they fully support his regime.

Armed rebels kill 28 persons and burn hundreds of buildings in a raid in West Java.

July 25—The Indonesian Army accuses the Communist party of paying lip service to President Sukarno's ideals.

IRAN (See also *U.A.R.*)

July 23—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi announces Iranian recognition of Israel.

July 27—Iran breaks off diplomatic relations with the U.A.R. following U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's tirade against Iran for recognizing Israel. Iran declares that it has given de facto recognition to the Israeli government for 10 years.

July 28—Iran is put under economic boycott by the Arab League for recognizing Israel.

ISRAEL (See also *Argentina*)

July 31—Former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. and representative to the U.N. Abba Eban is named Minister of Education in Premier David Ben-Gurion's Cabinet.

ITALY

July 5—Despite a government threat to keep order, even if it has to adopt "extraordinary measures," a Communist-dominated partisan organization announces it will hold an anti-Fascist protest meeting. The neo-Fascist party counters by announcing a meeting of its own. The Rome police ban all public meetings.

July 8—As riots continue throughout Italy, 3 are killed in Sicily.

July 19—Premier Fernando Tambroni and his Cabinet resign.

July 22—President Giovanni Gronchi asks Amintore Fanfani to form Italy's twenty-second Cabinet since 1945. Ex-Premier Fanfani, a Christian Democrat, accepts the invitation.

July 26—Premier Amintore Fanfani announces that he has formed Italy's twenty-second postwar Cabinet. The new Cabinet must receive the approval of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.

JAPAN

July 1—in a strong note Japan rejects Soviet

complaints that Japan has entered into an "aggressive" agreement by renewing the military security agreement with the U.S.

July 14—Premier Nobusuke Kishi suffers a minor knife wound inflicted by a supporter of the opposition within his Liberal Democratic party.

July 15—Premier Kishi and his cabinet resign.

July 18—Hayato Ikeda, pro-Western former Minister of International Trade and Industry, becomes Japan's ninth post-war premier.

July 22—At a news conference, Premier Ikeda rules out any immediate parliamentary elections, denies any intention to seek revision in the U.S.-Japanese mutual security treaty, and says he is satisfied with U.S. trade policy toward Japan.

KOREA, SOUTH

July 29—South Koreans vote in elections to the National Assembly and the House of Councilors, to replace the government of Syngman Rhee, who resigned on April 26. U.N. teams supervise.

July 30—Complete returns give a resounding majority to Dr. John M. Chang's Democratic party in the House of Representatives.

LEBANON

July 28—Ex-Premier Saeb Salam agrees to form a new Cabinet on the invitation of President Fouad Chehab.

MEXICO

July 7—A Mexican congressman declares that his country sides with Cuba in its dispute with the U.S.

July 11—Foreign Minister Manuel Tello, while expressing Mexico's sympathy with Cuba, says a statement by a congressman does not compromise the administration and is not necessarily a reflection of administration opinion.

PERU

July 28—U.S. Press Secretary James C. Hagerty announces that the U.S. will make available a \$53 million loan to Peru for land development and settlement.

POLAND

July 16—Ending a 14-year dispute, Poland

agrees to pay the U.S. \$40 million to settle the claims of American citizens whose property was seized by Poland.

SOMALIA

July 1—The National Assembly approves the act uniting the former Italian Somaliland with the former British Somaliland protectorate, ratifies a new constitution and elects President of the Legislative Assembly Aden Abdullah Osman to be President of the Republic.

July 12—Abdi Rashid Shermarke is appointed premier following the resignation of the former Italian Somaliland Cabinet headed by Abdullahi Issa.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE (See also *International, Berlin Crisis, Congo Crisis, Cuban Crisis, RB-47 Plane Incident, U.N.; and Austria.*)

July 7—The Soviet Union says it has successfully ended its missile launchings into the Central Pacific with a second test shot that traveled over 8,000 miles and landed directly on target.

July 9—Premier Khrushchev declares that the program for the first half of the second year of the Seven-Year Plan has been successfully fulfilled.

July 16—The Central Committee of the Communist party ends a 4-day Moscow meeting by endorsing Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence. Former President Kliment Y. Voroshilov retires from the party's Presidium and Leonid I. Brezhnev, President of the U.S.S.R., is granted his wish to be relieved of his duties as a member of the party Secretariat.

July 18—The Supreme Military Tribunal orders U.S. pilot Powers to stand trial for espionage on August 17.

July 24—The Warsaw Pact nations announce that Soviet Marshal Ivan S. Konev, their supreme military commander, has been replaced by Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, Soviet First Deputy Defense Minister.

July 28—*Tass*, official Soviet press agency, reports that Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev has arrived in Kiev accompanied by Hungarian leader Janos Kadar and East German leader Walter Ulbricht.

July 30—P.A.P., the official Polish press

agency, reports that a communiqué has been issued by the Soviet bloc's Mutual Economic Assistance Council at the close of a 4-day conference in Budapest. The communiqué calls for increased economic cooperation. In attendance were the 8 East European satellites, the U.S.S.R. and observers from Red China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

July 19—President Abdel Gamal Nasser names Nureddin Kuhalla to be Syrian vice-president, the highest Syrian governmental post.

July 21—The first Parliament of the United Arab Republic opens in Cairo with 400 Egyptian and 200 Syrian Deputies.

July 26—President Gamal Abdel Nasser closes the U.A.R. embassy in Iran because of Iranian recognition of Israel. (See also *Iran*).

UNITED STATES, THE

Agriculture

July 21—The nation's wheat farmers vote 87.3 per cent for continuation of government controls for their crops. Approval of 1961 quotas fixes government price supports at \$1.78 a bushel to planters who comply with planting allotments.

The Economy

July 20—The federal budget shows a surplus of \$1,068,101,353 for the fiscal year ending June 30. The previous year showed a \$12.4 billion deficit.

July 22—The Labor Department announces that the consumer price index rose to a record 126.5 per cent in June, an increase of .2 per cent over May.

July 27—The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve reduces the margin requirement on stock purchases from 70 per cent to 90 per cent, effective tomorrow.

Foreign Policy (See also *International, Congo Crisis* and *RB-47 Plane Incident*.)

July 6—President Eisenhower cuts back the Cuban sugar quota by 700,000 tons. In addition, 156,000 tons that would have been assigned to Cuba to make up for the

deficit of other sugar-importing countries will be assigned to other nations.

Eisenhower says he hopes there will be no need to resume the testing of nuclear weapons and that some permanent ban can be worked out with the Soviet Union.

July 8—The State Department asks the Mexican government for clarification of its stand in the dispute between the U.S. and Cuba. (See also *Mexico*.)

July 9—Eisenhower accuses Khrushchev of trying to set up a sympathetic regime in Cuba. He warns that the U.S. will never permit "the establishment of a regime dominated by international communism in the Western Hemisphere."

July 11—Eisenhower outlines his plan to improve living standards and strengthen democracy throughout Latin America. He hints that his new mutual assistance program will not include any countries that have sought or accepted economic or other assistance from the Soviet Union. The main reliance on financing will be on private investments and on establishing lending institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank.

July 21—The Agriculture Department authorizes the purchase of 617,385 tons of sugar from 12 countries to replace amounts cut from Cuba's quota. No reason is given for the omission of the Dominican Republic from the list of countries.

Government

July 1—Congress overrides Eisenhower's veto of a bill to grant pay increases to 1.5 million federal employees amounting to \$764 million yearly.

The House discovers that an error in the minimum wage bill it passed, on June 30, would have the effect of depriving about 14 million workers of wage and hour protection.

July 3—After an all-night session on the Cuban sugar bill, Congress adjourns, with the Senate voting to reconvene August 8 and the House August 15. The compromise sugar bill allows the President to set the Cuban sugar quota at any figure he wishes until March 31, 1961. (See also *International, Cuban Crisis*, and *U.N.*; and *Cuba*.)

July 13—The President appoints Charles H. King, dean of the Detroit College of Law, to the F.C.C., to fill the unexpired term of John C. Doerfer, who has resigned.

July 14—The Federal Communications Commission voids television channel grants to Boston and Miami owners accused of improper associations with former members of the F.C.C.

July 22—The Budget Bureau announces that the President has ordered a 3 per cent cut in federal employment.

July 29—The Federal Communications Commission announces that it will not impose a code of controls over radio and television broadcasting, but that it will review each station's programs to see whether they serve "the public interest" before renewing licenses.

Thomas C. Mann is named Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. His predecessor, Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., is appointed ambassador to Argentina.

Labor

July 12—The government reports that unemployment rose by about 1 million in June, putting the total figure near 4.5 million. Employment reaches a record high figure of over 68 million.

July 15—Martin F. O'Donoghue resigns as chairman of the board of monitors of the Teamsters Union. He says his assignment to clean up the union has been frustrated by the constant harassment of James R. Hoffa and his lieutenants.

July 16—The month-old walkout of machinists at 4 missile installations on the West Coast ends as the latest contract offer of Lockheed is approved.

July 21—The U.S. Court of Appeals rules that James Hoffa cannot be removed as president of the Teamsters Union in any manner except by a regular election of the union membership.

July 28—Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (the Landrum-Griffin Act), Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell brings suit against the Independent Petroleum Workers Union of Bayway. Mitchell charges that the union did not carry out the proper procedure for holding a fair election.

July 31—The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen refuses an L.I.R.R. offer that the trainmen take a 5¢ hourly cut in exchange for reducing the 6-day work week to 5 days.

Military

July 6—President Eisenhower, at a news conference, denies New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller's charge that the President has permitted U.S. defenses to deteriorate in the face of increasing Soviet military might.

July 20—The Navy successfully launches 2 Polaris missiles from a submerged submarine.

Politics

July 2—Former President Harry S. Truman says he resigned as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention because he does not want to be a party "to proceedings that are taking on the aspects of a pre-arranged affair." He urges Senator John Kennedy to "put aside" personal ambitions and support someone with more experience and maturity.

July 3—Senator Lyndon Johnson says he agrees with the Truman statement regarding the forthcoming Democratic convention.

Governor Nelson Rockefeller of N.Y. charges that the Republican party leadership is not interested in competition for the presidential nomination or in a discussion of the issues.

July 4—Kennedy rejects charges that the Democratic convention is "rigged" and asserts that the "strength and health and vigor" of a young man are needed in the White House.

July 11—The 1960 Democratic National Convention opens in Los Angeles. In his keynote speech, Senator Frank Church of Idaho accuses the Republican administration of rising unemployment, lowered farm income and foreign policy failures.

July 12—The Democratic Convention adopts a platform calling for expanded federal action to promote economic growth, strengthen foreign alliances and wipe out all forms of racial discrimination. Nine Southern states attack the civil rights proposals, which call for support of "sit-

in" demonstrations, voting guarantees and an end to school segregation.

July 13—Kennedy secures the Democratic presidential nomination on the first ballot.

July 14—Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson is chosen by the Democratic Convention as vice-presidential candidate.

July 15—In his acceptance speech, Kennedy warns that the national road to a "New Frontier" will call for more sacrifices, not more luxuries.

July 16—Senator Henry Jackson (Washington) is elected Democratic National Chairman.

President Eisenhower offers to keep Kennedy informed of foreign policy developments during the presidential campaign.

July 23—After an 8-hour conference with Vice-President Richard Nixon, Rockefeller issues a statement of 14 points of agreement on major foreign and domestic issues.

Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona charges Nixon with a "surrender to Rockefeller" and a betrayal of the conservative cause.

Kennedy is briefed on the international situation by Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency.

July 25—The 1960 Republican National Convention opens in Chicago. The Platform Committee approves planks on defense, foreign policy and civil rights that are weaker than the Nixon-Rockefeller "14 points." The Vice-President demands that these planks be reconsidered. Keynoter Representative Walter H. Judd of Minnesota attacks the Democratic platform and insists that the G.O.P. offers the best hope of avoiding war and maintaining prosperity.

July 26—Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus wins over 4 opponents in the Democratic gubernatorial primary. He is the first governor of Arkansas to be nominated for a fourth term.

New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller declares that he will not allow himself to be nominated for the presidency.

The Republican Platform Committee reverses itself and adopts a stronger civil rights plank incorporating many of Nixon's points.

July 27—The Republican National Convention unanimously nominates Richard M. Nixon to run for president.

President Eisenhower calls for a "middle road" policy.

July 28—The Republican Convention unanimously approves Permanent U.S. Representative to the U.N. Henry Cabot Lodge's nomination for the vice-presidency.

July 29—Kentucky Senator Thruston B. Morton is unanimously re-elected national chairman by the Republican National Committee.

July 31—Vice-President Nixon voices his split with the farm policy of Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson and pledges a break with "the rigid prepared positions we have been in for the last 8 years."

The Democratic vice-presidential nominee, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, launches his campaign in Nashville, Tennessee, where he appears at a rally with Southern Democratic leaders; however, dissident Dixiecrats do not attend.

Adlai E. Stevenson, meeting in Hyannis Port with the Democratic presidential candidate, urges his followers to support Kennedy.

Segregation

July 19—The Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals orders full integration of Delaware's public schools beginning in 1961. The court strikes down the grade-a-year desegregation plan the state put into effect last year.

July 25—Eating places are desegregated in Greensboro, North Carolina, where Negroes first started anti-segregation lunch counter "sit-ins," and in Norfolk, Virginia.

July 26—Twelve students are integrated into all-white schools in Arlington, Virginia, voluntarily after the Arlington school board recommended such assignment by the state pupil placement board.

VENEZUELA (See *International, O.A.S.*)

YUGOSLAVIA

July 30—Cuba and Yugoslavia sign an agreement for trade, technical exchanges and scientific cooperation.

—Katherine Hammond, Associate Editor, *Current History, 1952-1956.*

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